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GOOD FAITH AND THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
STANDARDIZED TERMS
ROBERT DUGAN*
The concepts of good faith and unconscionability increasingly
play a key role m the resolution of disputes over the enforceability
vel non of standardized terms, a problem which dominates con-
temporary contract litigation." Although both these general con-
straints enjoy explicit recognition in statute and case law,2 neither
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1. In the last two volumes of the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service, approxi-
mately one-half of the Article 2 cases involved the enforceability of standardized forms or
terms. See 25 U.C.C. REP. (P & F) (1979); 26 U.C.C. REP. (P & F) (1979). The litigation
raises a wide variety of issues. See, e.g., Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594
F.2d 129 (5th Cir.) (whether the good faith obligation limits the grounds for terminating a
standardized distributorship agreement), cert. dented, 100 S. Ct. 288 (1979); S.M. Wilson &
Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978); Community Television Serv., Inc. v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., 586 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978) (whether standardized exclusion of conse-
quential damages applies to express warranty created by advertisement), cert. dented, 441
U.S. 932 (1979); Perdue Farms, Inc. v. Motts, Inc. of Miss., 459 F Supp. 7 (N.D. Miss. 1978)
(whether a standardized form qualifies as confirmatory memo for purposes of UCC § 2-201);
Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978) (whether failure of a
standardized exclusive remedy revives the right to consequential damages in face of excul-
patory clause); Coast Trading Co. v. Parmac Inc., 21 Wash. App. 896, 587 P.2d 1071 (1978)
(incorporation of extrinsic standardized terms under UCC § 2-207); Butcher v. Garrett-
Enumclaw Co., 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978) (unconscionability of standardized
disclaimer).
2. U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-302; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 231, 233 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1970). Outside of sales law, the two constraints have found widespread recognition.
See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (good faith as key element in official immunity to civil
rights liability), rehearing dented, 421 U.S. 921 (1975); Handgards, Inc. v. Etlucon, Inc., 601
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litigation nor protracted academic discussion has reduced either
concept to a generally accepted set of working rules.3 The lack of
consensus as to the meaning of these terms may impair the regula-
tory efficacy of contract law.4 An equally important and, for the
most part, wholly unexplored corollary issue concerns the relation-
ship of good faith and unconscionability to each other and to the
other enforceability challenges 5 based upon incorporation, con-
F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979) (bad faith prosecution of patent infringement as antitrust viola-
tion); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976) (ma-
jority shareholders' good faith duty); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (good faith acquisition of
certain securities as defense to liability for short-swing profit under Securities Exchange
Act); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640 (c), (f) (West Supp. 1979) (good faith defense to liability under
Truth-m-Lending Act); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) (duty to bargain in good faith under 8(d)
of Nat'l Labor Rel. Act); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963) (good faith require-
ment for action by "interested" corporate directors); U.C.C.C. § 5.108 (unconscionability in
credit transactions and debt collection).
3. Without articulating working rules for application of the good faith concept, courts
identify on an ad hoc basis the type of conduct required by the good faith concept. See
Standard Alliance Indus., Inc. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978) (good faith
requires buyer to notify seller when repair efforts fail), cert. dented, 441 U.S. 923 (1979);
Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978) (good faith requires
buyer to afford seller a reasonable opportunity to effectuate a limited remedy). Litigation
under the unconscionability provision, UCC § 2-302, generally involves a balancing test, but
the courts display no consensus as to the number and identity of relevant factors and sel-
dom specify the criteria for balance. Compare Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co.,
395 F Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (two factors: lack of meaningful choice and unreasonable
advantage to drafting party), with Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549
P.2d 903 (1976) (ten factors).
4. Particularly obvious and distressing is the tendency to consider in unconscionability
analysis issues respecting formation, incorporation, construction and specific constraints.
See Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (applying UCC § 2-
302 to a situation more easily resolved by reference to UCC § 2-316(1)); Wille v. Southwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976) (list of unconscionability factors which
includes elements traditionally associated with determination of mutual assent, validity of
consideration, and construction); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544
P.2d 20 (1975) (discussing interrelationship of good faith, trade usage, assent, and uncon-
scionability). One commentator has defined unconscionability largely in terms of incorpora-
tion ("circle of assent"). See Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 1 (1969). The tendency to mix these considerations is nowhere more apparent than m
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which lumps together, in its chapter on interpreta-
tion, rules of incorporation (§ 237), general substantive constraints (§§ 231, 233), and inter-
pretation standards.
5. See discussion in Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20
(1975). In one notable development, courts are making increasing use of the good faith obli-
gation to preserve a clause from attack under UCC § 2-302. See Jamestown Farmers Eleva-
tor, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 413 F Supp. 764 (D.N.D. 1976) (extension clause in grain
contract held not unconscionable because enforcement of clause is subject to good faith
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struction, and specific constraints. In this article, the author pro-
poses and defends a working definition of good faith as applied to
the enforcement of standardized terms. In a sequel essay, he will
propose counterpart rules for unconscionability and explore the in-
terrelationship between the two general constraints.
RECAPITULATION OF THE PROBLEM
This paper builds upon six propositions formulated and de-
fended by the author in two earlier articles.6 First, standardized
forms constitute a recognizable commercial phenomenon charac-
terized by a collection of written contract terms (1) formulated in
advance for use in an undetermined number of sinilar transactions
and (2) presented to the nondrafter as a condition of doing busi-
ness.7 These two characteristics describe, respectively, the "ab-
stract generality" and "unilateralness" of standardized forms. The
definition encompasses precontract forms (purchase orders and
acknowledgements), integration forms (sales contracts and security
agreements), as well as extrinsic collections 8 (general terms and
mandate), rev'd in part, 552 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1977); W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp.,
273 Or. 701, 543 P.2d 283 (1975) (clause giving franchisor option of repurchasing inventory
upon termination held not unconscionable since franchisor must exercise rights in good
faith).
6. Dugan, Standardized Form Contracts - An Introduction, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1307
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Dugan, An Introduction]; Dugan, Standardized Forms: Uncon-
scionability and Good Faith, 14 NEw ENGLAND L. Rv. 711 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Dugan, Unconscionability]. For other recent discussions of standardized form contracts, see
Alpa, Protection of Consumers against Unfair Contract Terms: Legislative Patterns of
Controlling Adhesion Contracts in Europe, 15 WILLAmEr L. REv. 267 (1979); Dewey,
Freedom of Contract: Is It Still Relevant?, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 724 (1970); Epstein, Unconscio-
nability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975); Gluck, Standard Form Con-
tracts-The Contract Theory Reconsidered, 28 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 72 (1979); Rotkm, Stan-
dard Forms: Legal Documents in Search of an Appropriate Body of Law, 1977 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 599; Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1974);
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARv. L. Rzv. 529 (1971).
7. For a justification and elaboration of this definition, see Dugan, An Introduction,
supra note 6, at 1316-19. The definition closely follows that employed by § 2 of the 1976
West German Statute Governing Standard Form Contracts. See Law of Dec. 9, 1976, [1976]
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I 3317 (W. Ger.) (Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der
Allgememen Geschaeftsbedingungen).
8. "Extrinsic" collections of standardized terms refer to those terms which the drafter
does not reproduce in toto in the contract documents but seeks to incorporate by cross-
reference. For cases involving the use of such terms, see, e.g., Beathard v. Chicago Football
1980]
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conditions) and postcontractual forms (warranty manuals and in-
voices). Unlike many of the discussions in the traditional literature
and case law dealing with adhesion contracts and unconscionabil-
ity, this definition makes no reference to relative bargaining power,
the merchant-consumer distinction, overreaching, or the individual
vulnerabilities of the nondrafter. 9
Second, the use of standardized forms threatens two distinct
abuses, each associated with one of the definitive characteristics.1
The one abuse, "surprise," occurs when the content of the stan-
dardized term diverges from the expectations of the nondrafter.
This abuse follows as an inevitable consequence of the abstract
generality of standardized terms. Standardized terms cannot
achieve a uniform regulation of an indefinitely large number of fu-
ture transactions without disregarding the unique interests of the
particular nondrafter in the individual transaction." The con-
certed efforts of the education system and advertising industry
notwithstanding, many nondrafters, whether consumers or
merchants, approach transactions with distinct expectations. The
other abuse, denominated "imbalance," refers to standardized
terms which, by reference to some yet undefined standard, are too
harsh to warrant enforcement. Given the drafter's complete control
over the content of the standardized form, his profit motive, unless
constrained by competition (unlikely in our highly regulated econ-
Club, Inc., 419 F Supp. 1133 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (cross-reference to Uniform Customs and Prac-
tices for Documentary Credits held effective to render letter of credit revocable); Ebasco
Servs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 402 F Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (reference
to terms and conditions contained in manufacturer's handbook); Tampa Farm Serv., Inc. v.
Cargill, Inc., 356 So. 2d 347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (feed contract incorporates by refer-
ence the Rules of Grain and Feed Dealers National Association which limit buyer's remedies
to replacement); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978)
(warranty terms incorporated by reference on back of sales order).
9. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 149-55 (2d ed.
1980); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967). In defense of factoring out bargaining power, see
Dugan, An Introduction, supra note 6, at 1317-18 and Gluck, supra note 6, at 77-79.
10. See Dugan, Unconscionability, supra note 6, at 721-23.
11. This characteristic provides the standardized form with its economic and commercial
utility. See Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L.
REv. 1053, 1067-70 (1977).
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omy) or by legislative restraints, invariably will generate exces-
sively one-sided terms.
Third, the peculiarities of standardized form contracting under-
cut the jurisprudential basis for many rules of traditional contract
law.12 Those rules presuppose a contracting environment charac-
terized by negotiative interplay of conflicting interests. Whether
such an environment ever existed as a matter of fact or merely
represents an ideological construct for justifying the rules favoring
a certain economic class is not at issue here. Within such an envi-
ronment, many diverse features of traditional contract
law-including the matching-ribbon theory of contract formation,
the stricture against indefiniteness, the parol evidence rule, the
Hadley v. Baxendale measure of damages, and the absence of spe-
cific and general constraints on the substance of contract
terms-are .justifiable in that they reflect and further the interests
of both parties to a transaction. When, as in standardized con-
tracting, unilateralness replaces negotiation and abstract generality
precludes bilateral realization of interests, these traditional doc-
trines no longer serve that end. For instance, if each party pro-
ceeds from his own set of terms, the ribbon-matching rule enables
the parties to recognize the instant at which they become contrac-
tually bound as well as the terms of the contract itself. If, in con-
trast, all the terms originate with one party, such a rule is no
longer necessary. In an environment of negotiation, the possibility
of mutual influence upon contract terms minimizes the need for
substantive constraints upon imbalance. When, however, one party
drafts the terms, the institution of contract quickly becomes an
instrument of class oppression in the absence of substantive con-
straints. Likewise, the essential incomprehensibility of standard-
ized terms, which are neither read nor intended to be read by the
nondrafter, absolutely contradicts the integration assumption that
underlies the parol evidence rule. As applied in the standardized
contracting environment, traditional contract law as reflected in
the Restatement of Contracts enhances rather than mitigates the
potential for abuse inherent in standardized forms.
Fourth, in the last two decades, contract law has undergone nu-
merous changes in response to the abuses and peculiarities associ-
12. See Dugan, An Introduction, supra note 6, at 1319-35.
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ated with the use of standardized forms. The steady displacement
of contract law by the law of torts has occurred, in large part, as a
means to avoid the operation of traditional contract doctrine in
transactions consummated on the basis of standardized forms."3
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) keys its rules of contract
formation and construction to factors other than mutual assent, m
recognition of the absence or reduced role of that phenomenon in
standardized contracting.14 Section 237(3) of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts virtually abolishes the parol evidence rule as
applied to standardized forms.1 5 The specific substantive con-
straints found m recent remedial legislation-such as the federal
Truth-In-Lending and Magnuson-Moss Acts as well as state con-
sumer-protection and franchising statutes16-combat harsh terms
that almost invariably are imposed through standardized forms.
Other legislation-such as UCC section 2-207(2), UCC section 2-
316(2), and the extensive state and federal "disclosure" stat-
utes1 7 - obviously aim at the abuse of surprise. The gaps left by
13. The doctrine of strict liability in tort avoids the limitations imposed by the privity
doctrine and contractual disclaimers. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
The emerging law of innocent fraud circumvents the impact of contractual disclaimers and
the parol evidence rule. See Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th
Cir. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 552B, 552C (1977). See also Hill, Breach of
Contract as a Tort, 74 COLUM L. REV. 40 (1974); Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresenta-
tion, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1973).
14. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-205, 2-208 (role of trade usage, course of performance, and
course of dealing); id. § 2-204(3) (contract formation based on conduct); id. § 2-207(2)(b)
(incorporation based upon materiality of term); id. § 2-207(3) (contract recognition in face
of differences in parties' writings).
15. This provision, which is less of a restatement than a repudiation of common law, see
Dugan, An Introduction, supra note 6, at 1321 n.50, gradually is gaining acceptance by the
courts. See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
16. As examples of specific federal substantive constraints, see 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (1976)
(credit card holder's defenses against issuing bank); id. § 1667b (limitation of liability upon
termination of consumer lease); id. § 2308a (ineffectiveness of warranty disclaimer); id. §
2802 (Supp. II 1978) (limitations upon right to terminate motor fuel distributorship). On a
state level, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and its counterparts prevent the enforce-
ability of a wide range of clauses found m security agreements. See U.C.C.C. §§ 3.301-.309.
The Uniform Commercial Code specifically regulates certain clauses. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-
205, 2-209(2), 2-316(2), 2-719(3), 2-725(4).
17. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1976) (disclosure of financial information in connection
with sale of securities); id. § 2302 (disclosure of warranty information); id. §§ 1637-1639
(disclosure of credit terms); id. § 1667a (disclosure of lease terms); 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1-.3
(1980) (disclosure of financial information in connection with sale of franchise). State law
counterparts appear in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and its equivalents, blue sky
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the specific constraints are filled by the general mandates of good
faith and conscionability; the latter originated in an attempt to
deal with abusive standardized terms.18 These changes evidence a
legislative judgment that standardized transactions warrant special
regulation to protect the nondrafter against surprise and
imbalance.
Fifth, as applied to the use of standardized terms, the general
constraints of good faith and unconscionability should serve to reg-
ulate the abuses of surprise and imbalance respectively. Although
this allocation of regulatory function contradicts the generally ac-
cepted bifurcation of unconscionability into substantive and proce-
dural unconscionability,19 it is firmly supported by the text, inter-
nal structure, official comments, and legislative history of the UCC
and Restatement (Second) of Contracts.2 0 Even though such an al-
location says nothing about the substantive content of either con-
cept, it does establish that existing contract law contains a suffi-
cient number of instruments for complete regulation of the general
abuses inherent in the use of standardized forms. Moreover, the
association of constraints and abuses is a necessary first step in
defining the good faith and unconscionability concepts and thereby
alleviating the uncertainty which they, particularly the unconscio-
nability concept, have imported into contemporary contract law.
Sixth and last, the standardized form itself, as regulated by con-
tract law, provides the most appropriate vehicle for the resolution
of disputes arising from transactions subject to standardized
terms.21 Tort law and special remedial legislation operate with
rules of general applicability which, unlike those contained in stan-
statutes, and franchising acts.
18. The earlier drafts of UCC § 2-302 limited its application to "form clauses." For dis-
cussion, see Leff, supra note 9, at 490.
19. This distinction, which originated with Leff, supra note 9, and was propagated by J.
WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 150-66 (2d ed. 1980), has been adopted widely by the
courts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Fleisch-
mann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Schroeder v.
Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975). Cf. Majors v. Kalo Laboratories,
Inc., 407 F Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975), and Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433
(W Va. 1976) (both of which limit the UCC § 2-302 analysis to consideration of balance and
adequacy of the rights provided by the challenged clause or contract).
20. See Dugan, Unconscionability, supra note 6, at 730-35.
21. See td. at 743-45.
1980]
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dardized forms, are not easily revised, not necessarily responsive to
the interests of either party to a transaction, and not keyed to the
pecularities of the subject matter of a transaction. Rules drafted by
one party to a transaction, rather than by a third party such as a
court or legislature, provide a degree of regulatory flexibility per-
haps necessary for the smooth functioning of an exchange econ-
omy Because standardized terms are not amenable to comprehen-
sion or consent, whether the standardized terms are intrinsic or
extrinsic to the transaction is irrelevant.22
The law of contract now contains sufficient instruments to pro-
tect the nondrafter against the surprise and imbalance abuses. The
other, more subtle consequences resulting from the widespread use
of standardized forms-for example, suppression of nondrafter in-
dividuality and social alienation-are evils that neither the law of
contract nor any admixture of tort law and remedial legislation can
cure or even mitigate. They represent structural consequences of
an economy and citizenry dedicated to mass consumption and po-
litical apathy
PRELIMINARY ISSUES AND THE PROPOSED TEST FOR GOOD FAITH
Any inquiry into the scope and meaning of good faith must be-
gin with the general mandate in UCC section 1-203 and the defini-
tions in sections 1-201(19) and 2-103(1), which read respectively as
follows:
Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement.
"Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or transac-
tion concerned.
In this Article unless the context otherwise requires (b)
"Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade.
These provisions provide no information as to the meaning of good
faith m a specific case except that the concept requires considera-
tion of both objective and subjective elements. The honesty in fact
22. For a discussion of the parity properly afforded extrinsic and intrinsic standardized
terms, see id. at 740-45.
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definition combines an abstract subjective element (honesty) with
an equally abstract objective element (in fact). The reasonable
commercial standards definition also mixes abstract factual refer-
ents (observance, standards, and dealing) with vague evaluative
criteria (reasonable and fair).
The general mandate and definitions raise two significant
threshold issues concerning the application of good faith to the en-
forcement of standardized terms. First, does UCC section 1-203 by
its reference to "performance or enforcement" preclude application
of the good faith constraint to the other stages (formation and ter-
mination) of a contract? 23 Second, does the good faith constraint,
once accepted as an enforceability criterion, operate in that mode
through the honesty in fact definition and/or reasonable commer-
cial standards definition?24
Given the essential vacuity of the definitions, resolution of the
threshold issues and the eventual articulation of standards for
good faith require the identification and use of other authoritative
bases. For instance, commentators most frequently draw upon the
case law in the areas outside the UCC.25 Another less acknowl-
edged, but more direct source of information is contained in the
many specific references to good faith in the UCC text and com-
ments.26 To the extent that these Code references anticipate con-
crete situations, protect identifiable interests, and further specific
23. For a discussion of whether good faith limits a franchisor's termination powers, com-
pare Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), and Shell Oil Co. v. Mari-
nello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974), with Corenswet,
Inc., v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 288 (1979)
and Division of Triple T. Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191
(1969), aff'd mem., 34 A.D. 2d 618, 311 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1970). See also Summers, "Good
Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provwsons of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 220-21 (1968) (concluding that the good faith duty applies to
contract formation only by force of UCC § 1-103).
24. This issue has been litigated m transactions subject to both Articles 2 and 9. See, e.g.,
Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972) (whether UCC §§ 1-201(19)
or 2-103(1)(b) defines good faith as applied to the "buyer in ordinary course" element of
UCC § 9-307(1)).
25. See Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good Faith Disclosure
in Contract Formation, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 381 (1978); Suniners, supra note 23, at 199-
207.
26. U.C.C. §§ 1-102(3), 1-208, 2-305(2), 2-306(1), 2-311(1), 2-323(2)(b), 2-328(4), 2-402(2),
2-403, 2-506(2), 2-603(3), 2-615(a), 2-706(5), 2-712(1). In addition, the good faith concept is
referenced 84 times in the official comments.
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policies, they form a basis for developing the good faith concept."
For example, the other Code references to good faith shed con-
siderable light on the first threshold issue, that is, whether the
good faith mandate of UCC section 1-203 applies to the formation
as well as the enforcement of standardized contracts. Although the
nonpurchase references to good faith in the UCC anticipate a wide
range of transactional settings, they display one common charac-
teristic: they deal with situations in which one party unilaterally
determines the jural position of the other. 8 In every case the good
faith concept operates as a constraint upon that determination.
Because by definition the use of standardized terms represents an
act of unilateral jural determination, by analogy it should be
viewed as an activity subject to the good faith constraint. Specific
authority for applying the good faith constraint to the use of stan-
dardized terms appears in UCC section 2-311(1). This provision
anticipates a situation very similar, if not identical, to standardized
form contracting: the parties "agree" to little more than to do busi-
ness with one another and then "leave" the drafter free to specify
the particulars of performance.29 By imposing the good faith con-
straint upon such specification, section 2-311(1) either expands the
scope of the good faith mandate beyond "performance or enforce-
ment" to include one type of contract formation or subjects that
type of contract formation to a "duty within this Act" for purposes
of applying UCC section 1-203.
27. For an analysis which relies heavily upon these references to delimit the regulatory
function of good faith and unconscionability, see Dugan, Unconscionabiiity, supra note 6, at
730-40.
28. For instance, Code §§ 2-305(2), 2-306(1), and 2-311(1) involve situations in which one
party determines one or more terms of the contract; §§ 1-208, 2-603(3), 2-706(1), and 2-
712(1) allow one party to determine the measure of another's liability; §§ 2-324(b) and 2-402
involve vulnerabilities resulting from the particular factual setting.
29. The text of this provision and the official comments do not allude in any detail to the
commercial setting anticipated by this provision. The official comment does little more than
describe the subsection as a corollary to UCC § 2-204(3) and emphasize the leeway inherent
in the reference to "leave." Neither courts nor commentators have noticed the provision's
apparent applicability to the use of standardized terms. For typical application of § 2-
311(1), see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. CX Processing Laboratories, Inc., 523 F.2d 668 (9th
Cir. 1975) (applied to specification of date and amount of lot shipments); Neal-Cooper
Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974). For discussion of UCC §
2-311(1), see Dugan, Unconscionability, supra note 6, at 738-42. Cf. 1 J. EssER, SCHUL-
DRECHT, Allgememer Teil. 105-06 (5th ed. 1975) (discussing § 315 of the West German Civil
Code (BGB)).
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As a matter of regulatory policy and historical precedent, the
good faith duty properly applies to both the formation and per-
formance stages of standardized contracts. The pre-Code law of
contracts and sales abhorred unilateral jural determination.30 It
neither recognized a general duty of good faith nor contained stat-
utory counterparts to UCC sections 1-208, 2-402(1), and 2-706(1).
Such provisions extend the law of sales to include recognition of
the antecedents of rights and duties, namely unilaterally exercisa-
ble powers. The increased flexibility entailed by this extension
called for an equally flexible constraint. The appearance of the
good faith constraint in this role comports with its traditional ser-
vice in the law governing agents and fiduciaries, 31 who, like the
user of standardized forms, possess power to determine unilaterally
the jural position of another. Imposition of the good faith duty at
the formation stage of a standardized contract also responds to the
fact that events at this stage often generate expectations, the frus-
tration of which results in surprise, the main abuse regulated by
the duty
In respect to the threshold choice between honesty in fact and
reasonable commercial standards as the proper vehicle for imple-
menting good faith as a constraint upon the use of standardized
terms, the former standard has several advantages. First, it
promises uniform application. Whereas the reasonable commercial
standards definition applies only to some transactions under Arti-
cle 2,32 the honesty in fact standard applies to all Code transac-
tions. There is no apparent reason why standardized sales terms
should be subjected to a different good faith rule than standard-
30. An agreement which permitted one party to determine unilaterally a significant term
was commonly viewed as unenforceable for want of definiteness or mutuality. See IA A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 152, 157-58 (1963). See, e.g., Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Cooper's Glue Fac-
tory, 231 N.Y. 459, 132 N.E. 148 (1921) (traditional hostility to requirements contracts).
31. See Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 388 U.S. 304, 310-14 (1949) (discussing good
faith obligations of corporate directors); Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir.
1979) (fiduciary relationship in franchise arrangement used as basis for imposing good faith
duty); Waterbury v. Nicol, 207 Or. 595, 296 P.2d 487 (1956) (trustee's duty of good faith).
The good faith constraint appears throughout statutory regulation of directors' responsibili-
ties. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963) (good faith duties of interested
parties).
32. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b). Whether this definition applies throughout Article 2 or only to
those sales provisions which specifically refer to good faith is an open issue. See Summers,
supra note 23, at 212.
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ized terms in security agreements, negotiable instruments, or ware-
house receipts. In fact, use of the reasonable commercial standards
definition would subject the drafting party to two potentially con-
flicting versions of the good faith duty in the many transactions
which involve both standardized terms under Article 2 and terms
under other articles of the Code.33
The honesty in fact definition also seems inherently better
suited as a vehicle to consider the issues relevant to the surprise
abuse associated with the good faith constraint. As defined for pur-
poses of this study, surprise entails a divergence between contract
terms and the expectations of the nondrafter. These expectations
vary from one case to the next and generally depend upon the par-
ticular communications and parties' perceptions thereof. The rea-
sonable commercial standards definition anticipates subsumption
of various fact patterns under general norms (reasonable commer-
cial standards) and leaves little leeway for investigation into indi-
vidual expectations of the parties. In contrast, the honesty in fact
definition permits, by reference to "honesty," examination of the
subjective expectations of the parties and, by reference to "in
fact," consideration of the facts involved in the particular case.3'
Resolution of the threshold issues clears the way for formulation
of a specific standard for good/bad faith. Relying primarily upon
the specific references to good faith in the UCC text and official
comments, the author proposes a four-prong test for good faith as
it applies to the use and enforcement of standardized terms. (1)
Did the nondrafting party entertain a specific interest or expecta-
tion in respect to the subject matter regulated by the challenged
standardized term? (2)Was the interest legally cognizable? (3) Did
the drafter have notice of the expectation or interest? (4) Did the
drafter unduly disregard the interest or expectation? A finding of
bad faith requires an affirmative answer to all four questions.
On its face, the proposed test differs in several important re-
spects from the orthodox learning about good faith. Most signifi-
33. Such transactions include conditional sales contracts and consignments. See U.C.C. §§
1-201(37), 2-102, 2-326, 2-401(1), 9-102(2), 9-113, 9-114.
34. For use of UCC § 1-201(19) as a vehicle for evaluating the specific facts and expecta-
tions, see Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976) (good faith under UCC § 1-
208). Cf. Holmes, supra note 25, at 442-49 (using a similar definition to analyze factors
respecting disclosure in insurance contracts).
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cantly, the test reduces the abstract notion of honesty in fact to
four specific questions, three of fact and one of law (point 2).3 5 The
emphasis upon the nondrafter's expectations (points 1 and 2) also
conflicts with prevailing construction of UCC section 1-201(19),
which makes bad faith solely a function of the dominant party's
state of mind. In the following pages, the author first defends each
component of the test in terms of Code authority and commercial
policy and then applies the test to a number of concrete hypotheti-
cals taken from recent litigation. In a sequel essay, the author pro-
poses a similarly specific test for the unconscionability constraint
as applied to standardized terms.
Issue 1. Did the Nondrafter Entertain an Expectation or Inter-
est Respecting the Content of the Challenged Standardized
Term(s)'9
The role accorded nondrafter expectations distinguishes the pro-
posed test from the orthodox doctrines which view honesty in fact
as some vaguely defined state of mental innocence on the part of
the party subjected to the good faith constraint.3 6 The state of
mind approach to good faith had its origin in the law governing
purchase transactions, where it served as a constructive notice de-
vice.37 Both courts and legislators have recognized that the subjec-
35. Compare Summers, supra note 23, at 200-07 (rejecting the possibility of specific crite-
ria for good faith), with Holmes, supra note 25, at 402, 450-52 (identifying a "core of mean-
ing consisting of a spectrum of related, objective qualities").
36. "[T]he question [under UCC § 1-201(19)] is a narrow one focused only on the subjec-
tive intent with which the purchaser acted." Oscar Gruss & Son v. First State Bank, 582
F.2d 424, 432 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing relationship of notice and good faith requirements
for good faith purchaser status). "The good faith 'test requires honesty of intent rather than
absence of circumstances which would put an ordinarily prudent holder on inquiry. f"
McKay v. Farmers & Stockmens Bank, 92 N.M. 181, -, 585 P.2d 325, 329 (Ct. App.) (Su-
tin, J., concurring) (collecting various interpetations of honesty in fact) (quoting Eldon's
Super Fresh Stores v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 296 Minn. 130, -, 207
N.W.2d 282, 287 (1973)), cert. denied, 582 P.2d 1292 (1978).
37. See UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AcT § 56 (withdrawn 1951).
What Constitutes Notice of Defect. To constitute notice of an infirmity in the
instrument or defect m the title of the person negotiating the same, the person
to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or
defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument
amounted to bad faith.
Id. The objective definition of notice in UCC § 1-201(25) now performs this notice function
and leaves considerable doubt as to the role properly served by the good faith concept. See
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tive standard cannot be applied sensibly to the wholly different
nonpurchase context.38
Although neither the definitions nor the general mandate in
UCC section 1-203 support inclusion of an expectation element in
a test for good faith, this component finds ample authority in the
specific nonpurchase references to good faith throughout the
Code. 9 Of the many nonpurchase references to good faith, UCC
sections 2-306(1) and 2-311(1) anticipate situations most similar to
standardized form contracting in which one party is entitled by
agreement to fix unilaterally the other party's obligations. The
specification entitlement in section 2-306 pertains to only a single
term; that contemplated by section 2-311(1) compares favorably, in
potential breadth, to the specification entailed by standardized
contracts. In light of this fundamental similarity, conclusions and
inferences concerning the meaning of good faith under these sec-
tions deserve great weight in deriving working rules for application
of the good faith constraint to the use of standardized forms.
Even a casual reading of UCC sections 2-306(1) and 2-311(1)
reveals that the good faith element serves to protect the interests
of the subordinate party to the unilateral jural determination con-
templated by the provisions. According to the official comments,
the constraints of section 2-306(1) promote foreseeability, 40 and
those in section 2-311(1) insure that there is "no surprise and the
range of permissible variation is limited by what is commercially
reasonable."'4' Both foreseeability and surprise are functions of the
expectations of the subordinate party to the transaction. Although
the non-good faith constraints found in these sections unquestion-
ably advance the foreseeability objective, they are not sufficient
safeguards.42 Accordingly, the good faith constraint as used in sec-
Oscar Gruss & Son v. First State Bank, 582 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1978); J. WHrr & R. SuM-
MERS, supra note 9, at 562-63.
38. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 164 Ind. App. 516, 329 N.E.2d 620
(1975) (importing a reasonable man standard into the good faith constraint m UCC § 1-
208); U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b). On the distinction between purchase and nonpurchase versions
of good faith, see Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 668 (1963).
39. See note 26 supra.
40. U.C.C. § 2-306, Comment 2.
41. U.C.C. § 2-311, Comment 1.
42. The reasonable commercial limits constraint in UCC § 2-311(1) will not protect expec-
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tions 2-306(1) and 2-311(1) must protect some other aspect of the
subordinate party's expectations.
Most other references to good faith in the UCC text also require
one party to act with due regard for the other party's interests and
expectations. Particularly illustrative are those provisions (UCC
sections 1-208, 1-205, 2-508, 2-603, 2-614, 2-615) which the official
comments to UCC section 1-203 designate as "applications" or
"implementations" of the good faith mandate.43 Except for section
1-205, all of these provisions contemplate a situation in which one
party has the other party "at his mercy." The specific measures
prescribed by these provisions require the dominant party to act
with due regard for the other party's interests and expectations.
For example, under sections 2-508 and 2-614, the aggrieved party
(dominant by virtue of the powers associated with the other
party's breach) must permit the breaching party-the opportunity
to cure. Under UCC section 2-603, the aggrieved party must follow
the instructions of the breaching party as to the disposition of
rightfully rejected goods. Under section 2-615, the excused supplier
must notify his purchasers of delay or nondelivery and allocate ex-
isting supplies first to the regular customer. The main objective of
these applications and implementations of good faith is the protec-
tion of certain expectations.4 '
The official comments abound with specific examples of good
faith and bad faith conduct, almost all of which involve a domi-
nant party acting with or without regard for the interest of the
subordinate party. Consider the following illustrations. If the con-
tract entitles one of the parties to fix the price, the use of a posted
or market price satisfies the good faith requirement.45 In a supply
or output contract, good faith requires that the quantity specifica-
tion approximate a "reasonably foreseeable figure.' 46 In connection
tations based upon oral representations in the bargaining stage; the disproportionality con-
straint in UCC § 2-306(1) will not protect expectations based upon the supplier's or the
buyer's continuation of business.
43. U.C.C. § 1-203, Comment.
44. See U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (reference to "expectation"); zd. § 2-508(2) (reference to seller's
"reasonable grounds to believe"); id, Comment 2 (reference to "suprise"); id. § 1-208, Com-
ment (reference to "whim and caprice"); id. § 2-615(a) (reference to "basic assumption") &
Comment 1 (reference to foreseeability).
45. U.C.C. § 2-305, Comment 3.
46. U.C.C. § 2-306, Comment 2.
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with the enforcement of the unilateral termination clause, the ter-
minating party must give reasonable advance notice so that the
other party can make substitute arrangements.47 Good faith pre-
cludes an interpretation of contract warranty language that would
amount to exchange of a real price for a pseudo obligation.48 A
seller's good faith obligation includes full disclosure of material,
but hidden, defects that are known to him.49 Good faith requires
that a rejecting buyer follow the seller's instruction regarding re-
sale, storage, and reshipment.5 0 Additionally, good faith prevents a
party from arbitrarily rejecting assurances.5' In an installment sale,
a buyer must make any reasonable outlay of time or money neces-
sary to cure an overshipment and to cooperate with the seller m
curing a material nonconformity 52 These examples represent a
cross section of more than two dozen illustrations of good faith
contained in the official comments.53 In nearly every instance, the
good faith obligation serves consistently and primarily to protect
the expectations of the subordinate party
The standard for good faith in the nonpurchase references dif-
fers fundamentally from the interpretation of honesty in fact,
which requires nothing more than some otherwise unspecified state
of mind on the part of one party As used in these references, good
faith focuses not on that party's state of mind, but rather upon the
interests and expectations of the subordinate party Not supris-
47. U.C.C. § 2-309, Comment 8.
48. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 4.
49. U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 3.
50. U.C.C. § 2-603, Comment 1.
51. U.C.C. § 2-609, Comment 4.
52. U.C.C. § 2-612, Comment 5.
53. For other illustrations of good faith serving to protect the subordinate party's interest,
see U.C.C. § 2-306, Comment 2 (normal and sudden expansion or contraction in require-
ments contracts); td. § 2-306, Comment 5 (best efforts in exclusive dealing contracts); id. §
2-309, Comment 5 (notice in open time contracts); id. § 2-311, Comment 3 (cooperation in
fixing particulars of performances); id. § 2-312, Comment 3 (indemnification); id. § 2-313,
Comment 6 (fair drawing of samples); id. § 2-314, Comment 10 (conformity to label descrip-
tions); id. § 2-324, Comment 1 (noninterference); id. § 2-326, Comment 2 (presumption in
favor of general creditors); id. § 2-504, Comment 5 (cooperation in pursuing claim against
carrier); Ld. § 2-206, Comment 1 (impairment through partial acceptance); id. §§ 2-605,
Comment 2, 2-607, Comment 5 (notice of defect and loss); id. § 2-608, Comment 5 (content
of revocation notice); id. § 2-609, Comment 6 (use of insecurity clauses); zd. § 2-612, Com-
ment 7 (extension of time for negotiation); id. § 2-615, Comment 7 (readjustment to meet
new conditions); id. § 2-615, Comment 11 (allocation favoring existing customers).
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ingly, few of these references make any allusion whatsoever to the
dominant party's state of mind." Prevention of surprise reqires
that the regulatory instrument focus upon the operative compo-
nent of that phenomenon, namely the expectations of the
subordinate party. Because these expectations bear no necessary
relationship to the dominant party's state of mind, any test that
focuses solely upon that party's state of mind will not necessarily
promote foreseeability or prevent surprise. If surprise is the rele-
vant abuse, one element in any good faith standard must involve
the eipectations and interests of the subordinate party 55
Issue 2: Is the Expectatin Legally Cognizable9
Nondrafter expectations cannot be used as an element of a good
faith test without some associated standard for limiting the set of
protected expectations. Otherwise, the good faith mandate would
place the drafter at the mercy of the nondrafter's wildest fantasies
and, like the doctrine of unconscionability, would tend to engulf
the entire law of contracts."' Elsewhere in the law, expectations do
not appear as elements of remedial norms unless accompanied by
cognizability criteria. For instance, section 237 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, one of the few rules to employ expectation
as a specific element, requires that the expectation be reasonable
and apparent to the other party.57 Neither the general mandate of
good faith nor the definitions of that term in the UCC indicate
which expectations warrant protection. Considerable guidance,
however, is found in the specific good faith references in the text
and official comments which so strongly support inclusion of non-
54. A few of the 84 comment references to good faith associate that constraint with the
dominant party's state of mind. See U.C.C. § 1-208, Comment; id. § 2-323, Comment 2; Id. §
2-324, Comment 4; id. § 2-615, Comment 10.
55. See emphasis on the subordinate party's expectations in Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 231, Comment a at 92 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970), and Holmes, supra note 25, at
433, 442-46, 452.
56. See note 4 supra; Dugan, An Introduction, supra note 6, at 1329-30.
57. Other rules of law which ann, albeit not explicitly, at protecting expectations also
carefully delimit the protected expectations. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrS
§ 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) (imposing restrictions both in respect to the source (promise)
and manifestation (reliance) of the expectation). UCC § 2-313(1) restricts protection both
in respect to source (representation of fact) and function (basis of the bargain) of the
expectation.
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drafter expectation in the good faith test.
Nearly all the expectations protected by the specific nonpur-
chase references and illustrations share one characteristic: they can
be accommodated by the dominant party without any sacrifice of
the benefit of his bargain. For instance, the seller's right to cure
under UCC section 2-508, one of the "applications" of the good
faith mandate,5 does not impose upon the rejecting buyer any ad-
ditional expense or undue delay " It does not threaten the buyer's
right to performance or limit his available remedies in the event of
ultimate breach. Likewise, the buyer who complies with his "duty to
follow instructions under UCC section 2-603(1), another "applica-
tion" of good faith, is assured of reimbursement.0 Nor does the
pre-acceleration notice frequently imposed by the courts on au-
thority of the good faith requirement6' in UCC section 1-208 de-
prive the creditor of the benefit of his bargain. The many illustra-
tions of good faith throughout the official comments depict
behavior that benefits the subordinate party at no additional ex-
pense to the dominant party 
62
As a policy matter, recognition of expectations that can be ac-
commodated without any sacrifice by the other party is easy to jus-
tify Protection of such expectations enhances the classical role of
contract as a device that enables both contracting parties to en-
hance their individual welfare. Indeed, as a matter of social policy,
it is difficult to argue against any change that benefits one party
and does not harm the other."3
Another common, although not invariably present, characteristic
of the expectations protected by the specific references to good
faith involves the source of those expectations. In particular, ex-
pectations created by the dominant party receive a high degree of
58. See U.C.C. § 1-203, Comment.
59. The right to cure under UCC § 2-508(1) obtains only during the contract "time for
performance." Under UCC § 2-508(2), a "suprise" rejection extends the performance period
for a "reasonable time."
60. U.C.C. § 2-603(2).
61. The notice requirement is imposed routinely if the creditor has led the debtor to as-
sume the acceleration clause will not be strictly enforced. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Waters, 273 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145
(Utah 1976).
62. See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
63. See W BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 266-69 (1961).
[Vol. 22:1
GOOD FAITH AND STANDARDIZED TERMS
protection, whereas expectations based upon referents extrinsic to
the immediate transaction receive less protection. For instance, the
good faith constraint frequently appears in connection with a ref-
erence to other constraints such as "commercial reasonableness" or
more concrete standards.6 4 This fact indicates a general tendency
to deal with expectations based upon such external referents
through means other than the good faith concept. Moreover, most
illustrations of good/bad faith in the official comments focus upon
the behavior of the dominant party 65 This emphasis comports
with the subjective overtone of both the honesty in fact definition
in UCC section 2-101(19) and the emphasis upon fair dealing in
UCC section 2-103(1)(b).
The peculiarities of standardized contracting justify giving spe-
cial consideration to expectations created by the drafting party. If
the contract is negotiated, either party in theory can insure that
any expectation created by the other party finds express recogni-
tion in the agreement. In contrast, the nondrafter to a standard-
ized contract has no way either to determine whether the expecta-
tion-creating behavior finds express recognition in the contract or,
if it does not, to effectuate the necessary modification. The draft-
ing party can induce whatever expectations lead the particular
nondrafter to sign the agreement and at the same time employ
such standardized terms as will insure legal immunity for nonful-
fillment of those expectations. Unless the standardized contract is
to operate unfettered as a medium for chicanery and oppression,
such practice must be viewed as an abuse of the power given the
drafting class by judicial and legislative recognition of the con-
tracting device. The abuse in question inheres not in the particular
terms; indeed, merger and disclaimer clauses are, in the proper
context, legitimate means to achieve risk allocation and certainty
Nor does the abuse derive from the standardized nature of the
contract.66 Rather, the abuse lies in the use of standardized terms
in association with certain types of expectation-generating conduct
by the drafter. As such, the chief source of the abuse lies largely
64. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b), 2-306(1), 2-311(1), 2-402(2), 2-706(1), 2-712(i).
65. See note 53 supra & text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
66. The UCC implicitly sanctions the use of standardized contracts. See U.C.C. §§ 2-202,
2-209(2), 2-316(2), 2-719(3).
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outside the specific statutory regulation of such terms.6 7 A preven-
tive legal constraint must focus on the peculiar imbalances in stan-
dardized contracting, the preliminary behavior of the drafter, and
the expectations of the nondrafter. As discussed above, the good
faith concept is particularly well suited, both in terms of pre-Code
law and Code usage, to accommodate all three components.6 8
The role of good faith as a general constraint suggests a third
cognizability criteria, not manifest in the specific references or il-
lustrations. In order that a general constraint not engulf the whole
of contract law, the suggested good faith test must deny recogni-
tion to expectations based upon the law itself. For instance, a non-
drafter should not be permitted to avoid the statutory recognition
and regulation of warranty disclaimers as provided in UCC section
2-316 by invoking the good faith doctrine in connection with ex-
pectations based upon the statutory recognition of implied
warranties. 9
67. For instance, the regulation of disclaimers acknowledges the relevance of preexisting
expectations only to the extent that they arose out of express warranties. U.C.C. § 2-316(1).
The relevance of such expectations for the operation of the parol evidence rule is extremely
unclear under UCC § 2-202. Compare Action Time Carpets, Inc. v. Midwest Carpet Brokers,
Inc., 271 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1978) (parol evidence inadmissible), with O'Neil v. International
Harvester Co., 40 Colo. App. 369, 575 P.2d 862 (1978) (prior oral representations held ad-
missible as evidence of nonintegration), and Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co., 20 Wash.
App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978) (merger clause held unconscionable and thus ineffective to
prevent reliance upon precontract advertising representations). Similar confusion attends
the effect of express warranties upon a clause limiting consequential damages. See Commu-
nity Television Servs., Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 586 P.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978) (clause not
effective to limit damages for express warranty contained in advertisement), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 932 (1979).
68. The courts have begun to use the good faith standard to restrict the enforceability of
certain standardized terms by reference to these components. See Arnott v. American Oil
Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979) (good faith as restraint upon franchise termination); Ad-
ams v. J.I. Case Co., 185 IMI. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970) (dilatory and negligent repair
bars enforcement of exclusive remedy clause); Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321
N.E.2d 897 (1974) (bad faith prevents enforcement of merger clause); W.L. May Co. v.
Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 701, 543 P.2d 283 (1975) (clause giving franchisor option of re-
purchasing inventory upon termination held not unconscionable since franchisor must exer-
cise rights in good faith); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20
(1971) (lack of direct notice or constructive notice through course of dealing or usage of
trade may bar enforcement of exculpatory clause). But see Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrig-
eration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.) (good faith duty held not applicable to override express
termination clauses in distributorship agreement), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 288 (1979).
69. This is the counterpart to Professor Leff's point that once a warranty disclaimer satis-
fied the specific requirements of UCC § 2-316(2) it should not be subject to defeat under
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This enumeration of cognizability characteristics is not exhaus-
tive. No doubt, other commentators who analyze the specific refer-
ences and illustrations in the UCC will isolate other salient char-
acteristics of the interests protected by the good faith concept. The
pressures of concrete disputes will lead the courts to identify still
other characteristics that justify protection of nondrafter expecta-
tions. Moreover, at this point the author hesitates even to broach
the matter of necessary or necessary and sufficient conditions for
cognizability
The absence of an exhaustive list of cognizability criteria and/or
statement of necessary or necessary and sufficient conditions for
cognizability does not represent a flaw in the analysis. The analysis
aims at converting the abstract concept of good faith to a set of
specific working rules. Specificity is achieved in three ways. First,
the discussion focuses on a particular situation: the use of stan-
dardized forms. Second, it proposes a four-prong test which identi-
fies issues that are considerably more concrete than the blanket
issue, "what is honesty in fact?" Third, the test distinguishes be-
tween the factual and legal issues inherent in the good faith con-
cept. Whereas the first, third, and fourth elements of the test pose
questions of fact, the cognizability issue is one for the court. As a
matter of policy that is evidenced by the treatment of unconscio-
nability under UCC section 2-302, judicial control over the applica-
tion and evolution of any general undefined legal constraint is de-
sirable. Finally, any attempt to formulate necessary or necessary
and sufficient conditions for cognizability would convert the good
faith concept from a general to a specific constraint. This would
contravene the drafters' intent as well as the generally recognized
need for general constraints in any regulatory system.70
Issue 3: Did the Drafting Party Know of the Expectatin?
Exegetical, historical, and theoretical considerations favor the
inclusion of a culpability element in the proposed test for bad
faith. On the most obvious and intuitive level, the definitional
UCC § 2-302. See Leff, supra note 9, at 520-23. Contra Industralease Automated & Scien-
tific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977) (con-
spicuous warranty disclaimer held unconscionable).
70. See Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969).
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references in UCC sections 1-201(19) and 2-103(1)(b) to "honesty"
and "fair dealing" unambiguously indicate the significance of the
drafting party's moral involvement. As a matter of tradition, pre-
Code law extensively used the good faith concept as an implicit or
explicit culpability standard.7 1 Finally, in our legal system, liability
norms frequently include an element that focuses on the claimee's
personal responsibility for the injury 7 2 Fault-based liability has
been justified on moral, deterrence-related, and economic
grounds..7  The differentiation between degrees of culpability also
serves as a guideline for the severity of the liability incurred.7 '
Discussion of the fault component of a liability norm generally
proceeds in terms of the traditional common law categories. These
71. The culpability function clearly appears in those pre-Code provisions that used good
faith as a limitation upon the actual notice requirement. See, e.g., UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS AcT § 56 (withdrawn 1951). It appears that those provisions characterized bad
faith as something more than ordinary negligence. See UNIFORM SALES ACT § 76(2) (with-
drawn 1951) ("A thing is done 'in good faith' when it is in fact done honestly, whether
it be done negligently or not."). Cf. Gutekunst v. Continental Ins. Co., 486 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.
1973) (guilty knowledge or conduct necessary to destroy bona fide purchaser status under
UCC §§ 8-301 to -304). Outside purchase transactions, good faith was used widely as a cul-
pability standard in the law governing liability of fiduciaries. See note 31 supra.
72. "Liability at common law for injury to person or damage to real or personal property
is for the most part today based upon some moral or social fault." 2 F HARPER & F JAMES,
LAW OF TORTS 785 (1956). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281 (1965) (negli-
gence), 525, 526 (1977) (fraud), 552 (1977) (negligent misrepresentation), 580A, 580B (1977)
(defamation), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) (all
of the aforementioned cites predicating liability upon a culpability element), with RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 222A (1966) (conversion), 402A (1965) (products liability), 552C
(1977) (innocent misrepresentation), and U.C.C. §§ 2-314(1), 2-714(1) (liability for breach of
implied warranty) (the latter cites imposing liability without regard to culpability). Even
strict liability norms, however, frequently include fault considerations sub rosa. Under sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, fault considerations frequently appear m
connection with the reference to "unreasonable" and "defect." See Green, Strict Liability
Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1185 (1976);
Maleson, Negligence is Dead but its Doctrines Rule Us From the Grave: A Proposal to
Limit Defendants' Responsibility in Strict Products Liability Without Resort to Proximate
Cause, 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 1 (1978).
73. See generally 2 F HARPER & F JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 786-87 (1956); R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 137-42 (1977).
74. When liability is imposed without regard to fault, compensation is generally limited.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (liability for product defect limited to
recovery of property damage and personal injury); id. § 552C (1977) (liability for innocent
misrepresentation limited to recovery of warranty differential); U.C.C. §§ 2-714, 2-715(2)
(recovery of economic loss in connection with breach of warranty requires showing of knowl-
edge on part of seller).
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include willfulness, recklessness, gross negligence, negligence, and
culpa zn concreto, as well as actual and constructive notice.75 Pre-
Code law and the almost universally accepted construction of UCC
section 1-201(19) equate bad faith with conduct exceeding ordinary
negligence.76 At the other extreme, at least in the context of
purchase transactions, recklessness or intentional disregard of sus-
picious facts generally suffices for a finding of bad faith.7 7 The
threshold level of fault properly associated with bad faith lies
somewhere between these two extremes. This limits the inquiry, if
conducted in terms of traditional degrees of fault, to gross negli-
gence and culpa in concreto. The gross negligence concept, how-
ever, has fallen into general disrepute with courts, commentators,
and legislators.78 Culpa in concreto-a party's omission to exhibit
in the management of another's affairs the diligence which the
party exhibits in the management of his own affairs79 -offers an
initially attractive standard, especially in light of the drafter's
"management" of the nondrafter's affairs.80 The traditional appli-
cation of this standard-for example, to the liability of partners
inter se-rests, however, on the premise that the individual dili-
gence of the claimee party constitutes one of the initiating factors
for formation of the relationship in question.8l In contrast, m the
standardized contracting context, the nondrafting party has little
or no way to ascertain the business diligence of the drafting party.
Nor does the nondrafting party have any choice with whom he nor-
75. The various categories of fault and the role of notice have been discussed most re-
cently in connection with liability under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-
5 (1979). See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); United States v. Clarella,
588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1979).
76. See notes 37 & 71 supra.
77. See General Inv. Corp. v. Angelini, 58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971).
78. See 2 F HARPER & F JAMES, LAW OF ToRTs 945 (1956). The most recent erosion of
the gross negligence concept has occurred in the legislative and judicial challenges to guest-
statutes. See 63 IowA L. REv. 693 (1978).
79. See F WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 54 (2d ed. 1877).
80. The transactions subject to this standard generally involved some element of manage-
ment of another's affairs. See BGB § 690 (German Civil Code) (imposing culpa in concreto
standard upon the gratuitous bailee); A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP
395 (1968) (standard of care for partner not as great as that imposed upon a paid agent, viz.,
diligence of the ordinary prudent man); F WHARTON, supra note 79, §§ 515-516 (liability of
trustees and partners).
81. See F WHARTON, supra note 79, § 55.
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mally does business. Moreover, application of the culpa in con-
creto standard would afford the nondrafter no protection when he
needs it the most, for example, as against the habitually unscrupu-
lous businessman.
The unsettled state of the culpability doctrine and its relation-
ship to the good faith concept preclude, at least for the present,
the formulation of a generally acceptable minimum standard of
culpability An appealing alternative is to require a level of culpa-
bility which exceeds all the commonly aired minimum standards.
The proposed requirement that the drafting party's behavior occur
with knowledge of the specific interests or expectations satisfies
this condition. An actual knowledge requirement goes beyond both
the objective (reasonable man) standard implicit in UCC section 2-
103(1)(b) and the recklessness and culpa in concreto standards ap-
plied in purchase transactions. It should satisfy even the most
stringently subjective interpretation of "honesty in fact" under
UCC section 1-201(19). Moreover, when combined with the legal
cognizability requirement, it implies at least one generally ac-
cepted intuitive notion of dishonesty- a person is dishonest if, with
knowledge of another's justified expectations of him, he nonethe-
less acts in disregard of those expectations. Proposed only as a suf-
ficient level of fault, the actual notice standard leaves the courts
free to determine what lesser forms of culpability (recklessness and
culpa in concreto) also might support a finding of bad faith.
The actual notice standard counterbalances the emphasis on
nondrafter expectations m the first two prongs of the proposed
good faith test. Expectations constitute an extremely ephemeral
phenomena; they are easy to allege and difficult to disprove. Ac-
cordingly, although much of tort and contract law aims at protect-
ing expectations,82 the protective norms usually impose certain
82. In addition to the expectation-oriented norms, see note 57 supra, tort and contract
law generally seek to protect basic expectations. For instance, this is true particularly of the
contract rules governing formation, adjustment, and remedies. See U.C.C. § 1-106 (gears
remedies to expectation interest); id. § 2-204 & Comment (intent controls formal rules); td.
§ 2-207, Comments 4 & 5 (prevention of surprise is paramount); id. § 2-609(1) & Comment 1
(mechanism to protect performance expectation). In the area of tort law, expectations vie
with efficiency as the paramount goal. See generally Hubbard, Efficiency, Expectation, and
Justice: A Jurisprudential Analysts of the Cohcept of Unreasonably Dangerous Product
Defect, 28 S.C. L. REv. 587 (1977); Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Norma-
tive Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REv. 465
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side conditions that guarantee a high degree of probability as to
the existence of the expectations. For instance, satisfaction of re-
quirements involving "reliance," "materiality," and "basis of the
bargain" generally- insure that the aggrieved party did indeed har-
bor a particular expectation. 3 In the present context, however,
these side conditions are not appropriate.
Protagonists for the nondrafter will oppose the actual notice re-
quirement on grounds that, like the scienter requirement in fraud,
it subjects the nondrafter to an impossible burden of proof. Al-
though indeed severe, the evidentiary burden is far from insur-
mountable. Since "actual notice" refers to a state of mind which
defies proof as such, recourse must be had to circumstantial evi-
dence. 4 The law of evidence regarding proof of the scienter re-
quirement for fraud accepts as admissible, and virtually disposi-
tive, many types of circumstantial evidence. For instance, highly
probative of scienter is the defendant's control over property rep-
resented as nondefective. 85 In criminal law, evidentary presump-
(1968).
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965), RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548 (1976) (reliance); U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 538 (1976) (materiality); U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (basis of bargain).
84. By using the "good faith belief" doctrine, the main problem to solve is how a
trier of fact can obtain knowledge of the minds of others, to whose states we
have no direct, introspective access. This knowledge can only be obtained from
perceptible manifestations in speech, conduct and behavior of a person, or rea-
sonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. This requires a trier of the fact to
glean from the testimony and evidence such manifestations in speech, conduct,
and behavior of a person that it can know or infer what a person thought in a
given situation and whether the person was honest in what the person did. It is
foreseeable that an expert opinion may be necessary to assist the trier of the
fact.
McKay v. Farmers & Stockmens Bank, 92 N.M. 181, _, 585 P.2d 325, 329 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, - N.M. _, 582 P.2d 1292 (1978).
85. See Grissom v. Moran, 154 Ind. App. 419, -, 290 N.E.2d 119, 123-24 (1972) (in fraud
action against seller of realty, knowledge of defect inferred from seller's ownership and con-
trol of premises); Stanger v. Gordon, 309 Minn. 215, 244 N.W.2d 628 (1976) (employer's
fraudulent intent in describing retirement plan inferred from dealings with employees other
than plaintiff); English v. Bruin Eng'r, Inc., 201 Neb. 791, _, 272 N.W.2d 753, 757 (1978)
(defendant's knowledge of falsity of financial statement held properly inferred from Ins
making of personal loans to business's principal). A similar proof problem arises under UCC
§ 2-315 which requires, inter alia, that the seller knew or had reason to know of the buyer's
reliance. Courts regularly permit seller's knowledge to be established by reference to seller's
own representations or course of conduct. See Thompson Farms, Inc. v. Corno Feed Prods.,
366 N.E.2d 3, 18-19 (ind. App. 1977); Gellenbeck v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 59 Mich. App.
19801
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tions assist in the proof of the equally subjective intent element.86
In the context of standardized form contracts, the notice require-
ment relates to the expectations of the nondrafter. Accordingly, if
the drafter's express oral statements conflict with the subsequently
utilized standardized terms, the statements should be accepted as
circumstantial evidence that the drafting party had notice of the
expectations based upon the representations.8 7 Likewise, if an ex-
pectation derives from a particular term of the standardized form,
for example, exclusive remedies, the drafter's own authorship of
those terms should be admissible evidence to prove his knowledge
of the expectations based thereon.
Issue 4: Did the Drafting Party Disregard the Nondrafter's
Expectations9
Implementation of the good faith obligation will fulfill the stated
objectives of preventing surprise and enhancing foreseeability only
to the extent that it brings expectations in line with reality. In a
standardized contracting environment, the convergence of expecta-
tion and reality lies within the control of the drafting party. He
determines absolutely the relevant reality, the contract terms, and,
to a lesser extent through sales talk and advertising, nondrafter
expectations. Given this concentration of control, the drafting
party alone can prevent that divergence between expectation and
contract substance which constitutes surprise. Accordingly, the
drafter's response to nondrafter expectation must necessarily
figure in any determination of good/bad faith.8
339, 229 N.W.2d 443 (1975); El Fredo Pizza, Inc., v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 199 Neb. 697, 261
N.W.2d 358 (1978).
86. For instance, a party generally is presumed to intend the natural and probable conse-
quences of his acts. W LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 203 (1972). Cf.
Criminal Justice Act, 1967, § 8 (modifying this traditional assumption). See also Patterson
v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. Ct. App.), cert. dented, 435 U.S. 970 (1977); White
v. State, 83 Nev. 292, 429 P.2d 55 (1967); State v. Higgins, 67 Wash. 2d 147, 406 P.2d 784
(1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 827 (1966) (all upholding the constitutionality of various pre-
sumptions respecting the intent element of specific crimes).
87. In fraud actions, the "intent to induce" element is proved routinely by reference to
the content of the maker's representations, actions, and omissions. See Scaife Co. v.
Rockwell-Standard Corp., 446 Pa. 280, -, 285 A.2d 451, 455 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
920 (1972); note 85 supra.
88. The many illustrations of good/bad faith in the UCC official comments focus prima-
rily upon the nature of the dominant party's conduct. See notes 45-53 supra & accompany-
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The drafter has at his disposal two distinct means to minimize
surprise. He can adjust the contract terms to fit the nondrafter's
expectations, or he can adjust the nondrafter's expectations to fit
the contract terms. The first alternative cannot be implemented on
a prospective basis without sacrificing the institution of standard-
ized forms. Standardized forms owe their commercial utility pri-
marily to the very fact that they ignore the unique expectations of
the individual nondrafter8 9 The fine tuning of contract terms en-
tailed by the first alternative and the abstract, general nature of
standardized forms are mutually exclusive. This conflict in no way,
however, precludes the use of term adjustment as a remedial de-
vice, a matter discussed at length in the next section.
Unwilling to sacrifice the generality of his standardized form, a
drafting party can comply with the antisurprise objective of the
good faith mandate only by manipulating the nondrafter's expecta-
tions. He must bring any apparent nondrafter expectations in line
with his standardized terms. The nature of the necessary behavior
will depend upon the facts of the case, particularly upon the source
of expectations and the content of the divergent standardized
term(s).
A number of examples suffice to show the possible range of qual-
ifying behavior. Consider, for instance, the seller who makes exten-
sive representations in oral negotiations or brochures and then em-
ploys a standardized form that gives the buyer considerably less
and contains a tightly drafted integration clause. Undoubtedly,
this combination of circumstances has caused an inordinate
amount of surprise.90 To protect himself from liability for bad faith
under the proposed test, the drafting party must apprise the non-
drafter of the limited warranties and the prospect of total integra-
tion, thereby bringing the nondrafter's expectations into line with
the contract terms. Depending upon the circumstances, oral notifi-
cation or a separate signature requirement for the warranty dis-
claimer and merger clause might suffice as an adequate accommo-
ing text.
89. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1067-70.
90. Compare S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978), with
Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co., 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978). This type of
dispute is analyzed in detail in the text accompanying notes 100-18 infra.
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daton.9 1 Consider further the seller who through standardized
terms limits the buyer to the exclusive remedy of repair and dis-
claims all liability for consequential damages. Suppose the seller
nevertheless fails to repair and the buyer seeks to revoke his ac-
ceptance and obtain consequential damages.2 A prompt offer to
refund the purchase price and thus provide the buyer with the
monetary equivalent of the expected performance might enable the
seller to avoid an eventual allegation of bad faith.9 s Also illustra-
tive is the creditor who, having permitted his debtor to become lax
m meeting his monthly installment obligations, suddenly acceler-
ates and repossesses the collateral. To avoid potential liability for
bad faith conduct, the creditor, before taking any action, should
notify the debtor that further delinquency will not be tolerated. 4
Like the many illustrations of concrete good faith behavior, the ac-
commodation must demonstrate respect for the interests of the
subordinate party.
APPLICATION OF THE TEST AND REMEDIES FOR BAD FAITH
While the proposed test serves to identify bad faith conduct m a
specific context, it says nothing, either directly or indirectly, about
the existence or form of the relief available to the aggrieved party.
91. Some courts require as a prerequisite for enforceability that particular terms be
brought to the buyer's attention. See Posttape Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751
(3d Cir. 1976) (contractual limitation upon damages); Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bu-
reau Coop. Ass'n, 153 Ind. App. 31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1972) (warranty disclaimer);
D.O.V Graphics, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 46 Oluo Misc. 37, 347 N.E.2d 561 (C.P 1976)
(contractual limitations upon damages); Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380
(1971) (warranty disclaimer).
92. Compare Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978),
with S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978), for extensive
marshalling of authority on both sides of this issue. See Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes
of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CALip. L. REV. 28
(1977). The relevance of good faith to this dispute is discussed in detail in the text accompa-
nying notes 140-54 tnfra.
93. For a characterization of seller's conduct as bad faith, see Jones & McKnight Corp. v.
Birdsboro Corp., 320 F Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970). If the buyer can recover the monetary
equivalent of the price, however, courts refuse to strike down a limitation upon consequent-
ial damages when the exclusive remedy has failed of its essential purpose. See AES Tech-
nology Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 1978); American Elec.
Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F Supp. 435, 458-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
94. See note 61 supra. The relevance of good faith to this dispute is discussed in detail in
the text accompanying notes 121-39 infra.
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Although UCC section 1-203 mandates a general duty of good faith
and many Code sections impose it in particular situations, the
Code nowhere establishes a specific remedy for bad faith.9 5 None-
theless UCC section 1-106(2) clearly requires recognition of some
remedy for breach of the good faith obligation. Legislatures and
courts generally respond to bad faith by disallowing the drafting
party the benefit of specific contract clauses or Code provisions.9"
This disallowance may expose the bad faith party to damage liabil-
ity 97 Apart from recent developments in insurance law and situa-
tions involving incidental monetary relief, the courts do not award
monetary damages as a remedy for bad faith.98
It is the position of this author that the appropriate remedy for
bad faith generally consists of whatever measure will accommo-
date the expectation of the nondrafter with the least disturbance
of the drafting party's position. Since the relief will vary from
case to case, discussion of the proposed test as it applies to con-
crete disputes also presents a proper context for analysis of the
remedies issue.
The following hypotheticals present disputes that have occa-
sioned considerable litigation and academic commentary. Not sur-
95. See Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (bad faith alone does
not create cause of action); W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 701, 543 P.2d 283
(1975) (denying damage relief for unconscionability).
96. Bad faith under UCC §§ 2-311(1) or 2-306(2) precludes reliance upon a specified term.
Bad faith under § 2-706(1) prevents recovery of the statutory measure of damages. Buyer's
failure to comply with UCC § 2-508, an application of the good faith mandate, precludes an
effective rejection or revocation of acceptance. See Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1,
321 N.E.2d 897 (1974) (bad faith prevents reliance upon merger clause).
97. Thus, the buyer's failure to act in good faith under UCC § 2-603 will expose him to
liability for loss or injury to seller's property. Cf. U.C.C. §§ 9-507(1), 9-504(3) (secured
party's liability for failure to comply with provisions regarding default). See also Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Waters, 273 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (creditor's bad faith
under UCC § 1-208 exposes him to conversion liability for repossession following wrongful
acceleration).
98. See Larraburu Bros. v. Royal Indem. Co., 604 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1979) (insurance
case). See also Summers, supra note 23, at 252-60 (discussing the need for additional reme-
dies for bad faith and citing Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d
267 (1965) as an instance of damage liability for bad faith conduct in contract formation).
99. This reflects one of the key elements in the test for legal cognizability of the frus-
trated interest or expectation, viz., that it be one that could be accommodated by the domi-
nant party without sacrificing the benefit of his bargain. See text accompanying notes 58-63
supra.
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prisingly, discussion of these cases has treated the disputes as un-
related. On the surface, the consequences of "failure of essential
purpose" under UCC section 2-719(2) bear little resemblance to
application of the parol evidence rule in UCC section 2-202 or to
enforcement of a "for any reason insecure" default clause under
UCC section 1-208. The common issue in these hypotheticals is the
enforcement- of standardized terms which, although not inherently
unfair, nevertheless frustrate the expectations of the nondrafter.
So characterized, the cases invite application of the general statu-
tory constraint of good faith to prevent surprise in thecontext of
standardized form contracting.
Example 1. Good Faith and the Parol Evidence Rule
In precontract communications (advertising and sales talk), the
seller touts the quality of his product in such a manner as to
induce the buyer to deal with the seller. As a condition of doing
business, the seller presents for buyer's execution a standardized
form that limits warranties to certain technical specifications
and purports to integrate the entire agreement. When the goods
prove unacceptable, yet within the technical specifications, the
buyer seeks relief.100
Insofar as the dispute involves liability based upon the precon-
tractual representations, its resolution turns upon the require-
ments and interrelationship of UCC sections 2-313(1), 2-316(1),
and 2-202. The seller asserts that the merger clause precludes in-
troduction of precontract representations. 10 1 The buyer argues cor-
rectly that, under UCC section 2-202, the integration clause repre-
sents only some evidence of integrative intent and does not
preclude introduction of precontractual representations as evi-
dence that the parties did not intend the standardized form to be
100. For recent examples of this dispute, see S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587
F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978); Community Television Servs. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 435 F Supp.
214 (D.S.D. 1977), aff'd, 586 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979);
O'Neil v. International Harvester Co., 40 Colo. App. 369, 575 P.2d 862 (1978); Drier v.
Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (S.D. 1977); Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co., 20 Wash.
App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978).
101. See Franz Chem. Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1979);
Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 157 N.E.2d 597, 154 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1959).
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the final expression of their agreement."0 2 If the buyer succeeds on
the integration issue, he can introduce the same representations as
evidence of express warranty under UCC section 2-313(1).
The buyer's case usually fails not for want of a sound legal the-
ory but due to the fact that the nondrafter bears the burden of
proof in respect to both integration veI non under UCC section 2-
202 and "basis of the bargain" under UCC section 2-313(1).101
Both items focus primarily on matters of intent, a notoriously slip-
pery factual issue generally resolved against the party bearing the
burden of proof. Inasmuch as standardized merger and disclaimer
clauses shift the burden of proof to the nondrafter, the drafter con-
trols, albeit indirectly, the critical issue of intent. The resolution of
the intent element on the basis of nonconsensual standardized
terms, which are not read, intended to be read, or comprehended
by the nondrafter, runs counter to commonly accepted evidentiary
principles. 0 4 Although universally displeased with the result, con-
102. See O'Neil v. International Harvester Co., 40 Colo. App. 369, 575 P.2d 862 (1978);
Drier v. Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (S.D. 1977). The debate over the integrative effect
of a merger clause appears to have been resolved in favor of Professor Corbin. "[I]t is a
myth to assume that the document can conclusively establish its own completeness." F
KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 654 (1970). Compare 4 S. WELLIS-
TON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 633 (3d ed. 1961), with 3 A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 578 (1960). See also Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978); Mas-
terson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968); 52 WASH. L. REv. 923
(1977).
103. Once admitted into evidence, the writing creates a presumption of integration. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235(3) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970). This presumption,
however, is not conclusive. Id. § 240(a), (b); U.C.C. § 2-202, Comment 1(a). See also note
102 supra. The nondrafter bears the burden of overcoming the presumption. Under UCC
§ 2-313(1), the buyer must carry the burden of proving.(1) that seller made the requisite
affirmation of fact, see Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 269 N.E.2d 664
(1971); (2) that it went to the basis of the bargain, Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 217, 490
P.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972); and (3)
that the injury resulted from a condition covered by the warranty, Crocker v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 346 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1977).
104. Specifically, such resolution contradicts the notion that an evidentiary presumption
cannot survive "unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed
fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact upon which it is made to depend."
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969) (footnote omitted). Allocation of burden of
proof rests ultimately upon considerations of "policy and fairness based experience m
different situations." 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERIcAN SYSTEM OF EVI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 275 (3d ed. 1940). For instance, "[o]rdinarily a litigant
does not have the burden of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the oppos-
ing party." Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of America, 527 F.2d 843, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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sumer advocates have proposed no relief for nondrafters short of
legislative curtailment of disclaimer and integration clauses.105
The good faith doctrine offers an alternative approach to the
problem within the present statutory framework. The seller's con-
duct constitutes bad faith under the proposed test: (1) The buyer
harbors specific expectations respecting quality. (2) The expecta-
tions are legally cognizable in that they were created by the seller
and comport with the statutory rights afforded the buyer under
the implied warranty of merchantability in UCC section 2-314. (3)
A finding that the seller had actual knowledge of the expectation
can rest alone upon the fact that he created that expectation. e06 (4)
The use of the standardized integration clause without explanation
or warning shows disregard for the expectations. Conceivable rem-
edies for bad faith include avoidance of the merger clauses, avoid-
ance of the entire contract and, after the manner of UCC section 2-
207(3), relegation of the parties to their Code rights, reallocation of
the burden of proof, and damages (nominal, compensatory, and
punitive).
Award of damages must overcome both theoretical problems and
historical animus. Except for some recent insurance cases, no au-
thority exists for awarding damages for bad faith conduct. 107 The
traditional constraints of certainty and causation'0 8 make difficult
the computation of compensatory damages. Whereas nominal dam-
ages will not provide sufficient relief, an award of punitive damages
faces the specific constraint in UCC section 1-106(1)109 that such
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1976) (implied warranties rendered nondisclaimable in many
consumer sales by Magnuson-Moss Act of 1976).
106. See notes 84-87 supra & accompanying text.
107. See Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (breach of UCC § 1-203
alone does not constitute basis for damage liability). For damage awards for bad faith in
insurance cases, see note 98 supra; Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 533 (1970); Annot., 85 A.L.R.3d
1211 (1978).
108. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 330, 331 (1932). See also Summers, note 23 supra, at
253-55 (advocating recognition of special cases in which the aggrieved party should recover
consequential damages for bad faith even though the injury was not otherwise compensable
under traditional contract rules governing damage liability).
109. See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932) ("Punitive damages are not recov-
erable for breach of contract."). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 369 (Tent.
Draft No. 14, 1979) ("Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless
the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recover-
able."); Waters v. Trenckmann, 503 P.2d 1187 (Wyo. 1972) (award of punitive damages re-
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damages may be awarded only if authorized by the Code or by
other rule of law.
Avoidance of the contract or objectionable terms, the most com-
monly utilized remedy for bad faith,110 requires reconciliation with
the sanctity of contract axiom, which precludes avoidance unless
specifically authorized by statute or common law. Except for
grounds concerning fraud and public policy, the UCC exhaustively
regulates-under specific constraints such as sections 2-316(2) and
2-209(2), as well as through more general constraints such as sec-
tions 2-302 and 1-102(2)-the conditions under which a court may
declare a clause or contract unenforceable."" Furthermore, because
good faith is a general constraint its application to avoid a contract
or terms thereof would duplicate the function of unconscionability
under section 2-302, but without the additional safeguards im-
posed by that provision.
This argument ignores the distinction between inherently unfair
terms and the illegitimate use of otherwise fair terms.1 2 In the hy-
pothetical, the disputed terms are not inherently unfair; indeed,
they enjoy express statutory approval."l 3 The buyer objects, rather,
to their particular use in his transaction. Such abuse is not cogni-
zable under UCC section 2-302 which, properly construed, aims at
control of inherently unfar terms," 4 viz., ones that unduly distort
the balance immanent in the statutory regulation of the contract
for sale." 5 When the abusiveness of the term depends upon the
versed since plaintiff made no showing of actual fraud in connection with defendant's
breach of sales contract).
110. See note 96 supra.
111. The special regulation of warranty disclaimer would preclude application of UCC §
2-302 to such contract provisions. See Leff, supra note 9, at 522-25. The most frequently
litigated version of this question is whether, in franchise termination cases, the special rule
in UCC § 2-309(2) precludes application of UCC § 1-203. Compare Arnott v. American Oil
Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), with Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594
F.2d 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 288 (1979).
112. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
113. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (limited warranties), id. § 2-209(2) (certain type of merger
clauses).
114. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
115. This standard is implicit in the usual expositions of substantive unconscionability in
which "one party is deprived of all the benefits of the agreement or left without a remedy
for another party's nonperformance or breach." Bank of Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F Supp.
104, 110 (S.D. Miss. 1979) (citation omitted) (lease of dairy cows held unconscionable by
reference to this standard). See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. V. 1976)
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particular circumstances surrounding its use, there is no need for a
hearing, like that contemplated under UCC section 2-302(2), to ex-
plore the general commercial background. Code sections 1-203 and
2-311(1), by their reference to enforcement and validity, fairly in-
ply that remedies for bad faith shall include avoidance of the par-
ticular term. Moreover, numerous illustrations of good faith and
bad faith in the official comments indicate the propriety of denying
enforceability or implying terms as a remedy for bad faith.116
Reallocation of the evidentiary burden represents a potentially
effective alternative to damages and avoidance as a remedy for bad
faith. In the instant case, the traditional allocation of burden of
proof, in respect to integration vel non and "basis of the bargain,"
frequently prevents the nondrafter from enforcing liability under
the otherwise favorable substantive law.1 7 A shift m evidentiary
burden to the drafter undoubtedly would enhance the probability
of a probuyer result. This remedy does not entail, as does avoid-
ance, any overt tampering with the contract terms or, as does dam-
ages, any modification of traditional remedial principles. Moreover,
under the law of evidence, the allocation of evidentiary burdens
follows primarily from considerations of fairness, relative access to
evidence,118 and, more recently, due process principles. As dis-
cussed above, the equities clearly lie with the nondrafter. More-
over, the drafting party's unquestioned control over the con-
tracting process places him in a superior position to insure
documentation and compliance with the intent requirements of
UCC sections 2-202 and 2-313(1). Finally, due process militates
against recognition of presumptions-for example, that merger
clauses are conclusive evidence of integration-that have no basis
in fact.1 9 Reallocation of the burden of proof prevents the drafter
(termination clause held unconscionable because of one-sidedness, without regard to relative
bargaining power). In a sequel to this article, the author will propose working rules for this
standard of balance.
116. See U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 2 (good faith as prerequisite for enforceable modifica-
tions); id. § 2-305(2) & Comment 3 (good faith as prerequisite for enforceability of unilater-
ally specified price term); id. § 2-309, Comment 5 (good faith requiring notice); &d. § 2-313,
Comment 6 (good faith mandates fair drawing of a sample from existing bulk); Id. § 2-609,
Comment 6 (good faith as constraint upon enforceability of certain cancellation clauses).
117. See notes 102-04 supra & accompanying text.
118. See note 104 supra.
119. Due process protection extends to any contract with the state or one involving "state
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from bootstrapping himself around the intent reqirement of the
applicable legal norms by reference to standardized terms that run
counter to specific nondrafter intent created by the behavior of the
drafting party
Example 2: Conflict Between Standardized Terms and Factual
Contract Referents120
Debtor signs a standardized security agreement which entitles
the creditor to payments within the first ten days of the month.
The contract also provides that time is of the essence and that
the creditor can declare default for breach of any specific obliga-
tion imposed by the agreement or upon feeling insecure for any
reason. Although the debtor performs erratically (late payments,
skipped payments, or double payments), the creditor accepts all
payments without objection. When the debtor is one payment in
arrears and two days late on the current payment, the creditor
exercises, without notice to the debtor, his contractual and stat-
utory default rights. Debtor resists the resulting claim for defi-
ciency and counterclaims for conversion damages. 121
Liability for either deficiency or conversion depends ultimately
upon whether the debtor's conduct constituted default. 22 The
action." Compare Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (regulation of
private utility held not sufficient to create state action), with Barry v. Barchi, 99 S. Ct. 2642
(1979) (regulation of horse racing renders private corporation's termination of lease "state
action"). In private litigation, Western & A.R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929), estab-
lished on due process principles the natural relation test for presumptions. This test has
been criticized but never overruled. See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & N. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
301101] (1979). The Supreme Court recently has upheld presumptions in civil proceedings
not by reference to lack of federal issue but on the grounds that the presumption was a
defensible inference. See Barry v. Barchi, 99 S. Ct. 2642, 2649 (1979). Conclusive presump-
tions are subject to special scrutiny. See Turner v. Department of Employment Security and
Bd. of Review, 423 U.S. 44 (1975). See also Gordon & Tenenbaum, Conclusive Presumption
Analysis: The Principle of Individual Opportunity, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 579 (1976).
120. "Factual contract referents" refer to trade usage, course of dealing, course of per-
formance, or other party behavior that serves, in addition to the parties' agreement and law
itself, as a source for contract terms. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-205, 2-204(1), 2-207(3), 2-208.
121. For recent cases involving this fact pattern, see note 61 supra; Universal C.LT.
Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 164 Ind. App. 516, 329 N.E.2d 620 (1975); Fontaine v. Industrial
Nat'l Bank, 111 R.I. 6, 298 A.2d 521 (1973).
122. In the absence of default, the creditor may not proceed under UCC §§ 9-501 to -507,
and his seizure of the collateral is an unauthorized dispossession for purposes of conversion.
See RE STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1966).
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creditor justifies the declaration of default by reference to the
debtor's failure to meet his monthly installment obligation as con-
strued in light of the "time is of the essence" clause and/or the
"for any reason insecure" clause. To avoid deficiency liability and
succeed with the conversion claim, the debtor must refute both al-
legations. The debtor relies primarily upon the doctrine of good
faith to avoid the "for any reason insecure" argument under UCC
section 1-208 and upon the doctrine of waiver as found in the par-
ties' course of performance to avoid the impact of the "time is of
the essence" clause.
Although debtors enjoy success under the facts of the hypotheti-
cal, 123 their case is not without theoretical and practical difficulties.
The good faith challenge under UCC section 1-208 may fail both
for want of a satisfactory definition of bad faith and the statutory
allocation of the burden of proof. So long as bad faith remains
vaguely defined solely in terms of some state of mind on the part
of the creditor, it eludes proof by the debtor.124 Creditors can resist
the waiver challenge on the grounds that the course of perform-
ance rules only apply to Article 2 disputes 125 and that, even if they
123. The debtor prevailed in the four cases cited in notes 61 and 121 supra. The vast
preponderance of cases under UCC § 1-208 are decided in favor of the creditor. The author,
however, was unable to find a single procreditor decision that involved the type of lax collec-
tion practices presented by the hypothetical.
124. Compare Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Shepler, 164 Ind. App. 516, 329 N.E.2d 620
(1975) (adopting a reasonable man standard in order to alleviate the debtor's evidentiary
burden), with Blame v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 82 Misc. 2d 653, 370 N.Y.S.2d
323 (Sup. Ct. 1975) ("good faith is a matter of creditor's actual mental state"). See also
Ginn v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 145 Ga. App. 175, 243 S.E.2d 528 (1978) (reversing sum-
mary judgment in favor of creditor on good faith issue under UCC § 1-208); McKay v.
Farmers & Stockmens Bank, 92 N.M. 181, 585 P.2d 325 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, - N.M.
- 582 P.2d 1292 (1978).
125. Compare Anderson v. Mobile Discount Corp., 122 Ariz. 411, 595 P.2d 203 (Ct. App.
1979) (UCC § 2-302 held not applicable to secured transaction dispute), and United Am.
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Wild West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 221 Kan. 523, 561 P.2d 792
(1977), and Wabasso State Bank v. Caldwell Packing Co., 308 Minn. 349, 251 N.W.2d 321
(1976) (course of dealing cannot contradict terms in security agreement), and Borg-Warner
Acceptance Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Minn. 20, 238 N.W.2d 612 (1976) (course of per-
formance held not applicable to vary terms of agreements under Article 9), with Hedrick
Say. Bank v. Myers, 229 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1975) (course of dealing held applicable to mod-
ify security agreement rights), and Southwest Washington Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank, 19 Wash. App. 397, 577 P.2d 589 (1978), rev'd, 92 Wash. 2d 30, 593 P.2d
167 (1978) (UCC § 2-208 held applicable to show course of performance waiver of clause m
security agreement).
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are applicable, a prodebtor result would violate UCC section 2-
208(2) in that course of performance would control an express
term.
The proposed test for good faith somewhat alleviates the
debtor's difficulties under UCC section 1-208. The test applies be-
cause the dispute involves the enforcement of standardized terms.
Moreover, the "for any reason insecure" clause invites unilateral
jural determination in its purest form. As applied to the secured
party's act in enforcing the clause, the test states the good faith
issue in a manner amenable to proof by the aggrieved party. The
debtor undoubtedly harbored an expectation that Ins conduct
would not result in default. The creditor's role in creating that ex-
pectation suffices to take the knowledge issue to the jury. The
creditor omitted to undertake that step which would have
respected the expectation without sacrificing the creditor's benefit
of the bargain, viz., warning the debtor that continued laxity would
result in acceleration and repossession.
The remaining element of the test, the legal cognizability of the
expectation, is not so obviously satisfied. As discussed above,128
factors involved in determining legal cognizability include (1)
source of the expectation, (2) ease of accommodation, and (3) ab-
sence of specific regulation by the contract, statute, or other rules
of law. Here, the fact that the creditor created and could have ac-
commodated easily the expectation without any sacrifice of his
bargain militates in favor of legal cognizability On the other hand,
insofar as the expectation rests upon a course of performance, rec-
ognition may violate specific UCC regulation. Specifically, it would
make course of performance relevant to Article 1 problems in the
absence of specific recognition in UCC section 1-205.2 Even if
course of performance did apply to Article 1 disputes, perhaps by
reference to the definition of.agreement in section 1-201(1), a pro-
debtor result based on good faith may contravene UCC section 2-
208(2) by giving precedence to course of performance over express
contract language to the contrary"28 Such a result also may cir-
126. See text accompanying notes 58-69 supra.
127. See note 125 supra.
128. See Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.) (holding m
a distributorship termination suit that "good faith obligation can[not] properly be used
to override or strike express contract terms"), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 288 (1979).
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cumvent the requirements for waiver under UCC sections 2-208(3)
and 2-209(4). Although superficially attractive, these arguments
cannot withstand closer scrutiny
The proposed good faith test does not contravene or distort, ei-
ther in its prerequisites or results, the statutory regulation of
course of performance. As a general proposition, a single precept
seldom exhausts the legal significance of a particular real world
event.12 Even if the course of performance rules in UCC sections
2-208 and 2-209 apply only to Article 2,180 the parties' nonverbal
conduct is nonetheless significant for other legal precepts such as
good faith. The official comments, as well as the case law anent the
general contract principles preserved under UCC section 1-103,
underscore the relevance of nonverbal conduct outside Article 2.131
Indeed, the reference to "performance" in UCC section 1-203 alone
should defeat the creditor's challenge to the cognizability of an ex-
pectation based upon the parties' performance. Finally, when
viewed in terms of Code structure and philosophy, the regulation
of course of performance in Article 2 represents one implementa-
tion of the general good faith mandate in UCC section 1-203 1s2
and, as such, provides inferential support for basing legal
cognizability upon party performance.
UCC section 2-208(2) does not preclude a finding of bad faith
129. Thus a buyer's conduct in taking possession of goods can be relevant under UCC
§8 2-206 (acceptance of offer) and 2-606 (acceptance of goods).
In an action under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), the nature
of the misrepresented or omitted fact is relevant to the elements of causation, materiality,
and reliance. See generally Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 816 (1976).
130. The reference to "course of performance" m UCC § 1-201(3) is specifically limited by
the phrase, "as provided in this Act." Hence, the Article 9 definitional cross-references to
"agreement" do not incorporate UCC § 2-208(l). See note 125 supra.
131. See U.C.C. §§ 1-102, Comment 2; 1-204, Comment 2; 1-207, Comment 2 (course of
performance relevant to implementation of those non-Article 2 sections). On the appli-
cability of waiver and estoppel based upon party conduct to cases outside Article 2, see
generally, Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 906 (1978). For application of waiver doctrine based
upon party conduct in Article 9 transactions, see Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 77 N.M. 554,
425 P.2d 726 (1967); Southwest Washington Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank,
19 Wash. App. 397, 577 P.2d 589, reu'd, 92 Wash. 2d 30, 593 P.2d 167 (1978).
132. Although the official comment to UCC § 1-203 mentions only trade usage and course
of dealing as implementations of that section, the same reasoning justifies a similar interpre-
tation of UCC § 2-208. See U.C.C. §§ 1-205, Comments 1 & 2; 2-208, Comment 1.
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even though such a finding would weight the parties' conduct more
heavily than the language of their agreement. On the one hand, the
rule probably does not apply to disputes outside of Article 2.183
Moreover, the rules in section 2-208 act not as independent con-
straints upon application of the good faith mandate but as specific
examples of the good faith obligation."' Accordingly, application
of the rule in section 2-208(2) must always accord with the basic
purposes of section 1-203. For instance, as stated in the official
comments, UCC section 2-208(2) must yield whenever its applica-
tion would result in surprise,' s the prevention of which represents
the principal objective of the good faith obligation. The rule in sec-
tion 2-208(2) orders various contract referents according to their
relative indicativeness of mutual intent. Arguably its reference to
"express language" should not include standardized terms because
such terms have no bearing whatsoever upon the actual intent of
one of the parties.1 36
Nor does the proposed test for good faith duplicate the doctrine
of waiver. The elements of waiver differ markedly from those pro-
posed to determine bad faith. Waiver requires a (1) voluntary re-
linquishment of a (2) known right and, (3) in some jurisdictions or
contexts, an additional validating cause such as consideration, a
writing, or promissory estoppel. 3 7 In contrast, the proposed test
133. See note 130 supra.
134. See note 132 supra & accompanying text.
135. See U.C.C. § 2-208, Comment 3.
136. This result is adopted by Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1970) in the face of the similar mterreferent priority rule in Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 229(b) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970). See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins.
Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
137. Waiver is the "voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right
known by him to exist." Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, -, 186
N.W.2d 99, 104 (1971) (citation omitted) (defining waiver in context of a farm products
dispute under UCC §§ 9-306(2) and 9-307). For waiver cases involving severance of security
interests in farm products, see North Central Kan. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales
Co., 233 Kan. 689, 577 P.2d 35 (1978) (effect of constructive notice of contested right of
party asserting waiver); Wabasso State Bank v. Caldwell Packing Co., 308 Minn. 349, 251
N.W.2d 321 (1976) (waiver and course of dealing under UCC § 1-205(4)); Garden City Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971) (necessity for positive action
and not mere silence); Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 77 N.M. 554, -, 425 P.2d 726, 734
(1967) (Carmody, J., dissenting) (necessity of knowledge); Baker Prod. Credit Ass'n. v. Long
Creek Meat Co., 266 Or. 643, 513 P.2d 1129 (1973) (possibility of conditional waiver); South-
west Washington Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 19 Wash. App. 397, 577
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for good faith requires (1) the use of standardized terms, (2) legally
cognizable expectations on the part of the nondrafter, and (3)
knowledge and disregard thereof by the drafting party Whereas
the waiver doctrine regulates the relinquishment of undisputed
rights, the good faith doctrine as implemented in the proposed test
regulates the protection of certain expectations in a specific con-
text. Application of the waiver doctrine results in a single "rem-
edy," viz., nonenforcement of the waived right; the remedies for
bad faith may include, in addition to nonenforcement of a term,
damages or reallocation of evidentiary burdens. It is immaterial
that the application of the good faith test to the immediate trans-
action may lead to the same result as the waiver doctrine. Identical
liability allocations frequently follow applications of different legal
norms.
38
In summary, neither the waiver doctrine nor rules governing
course of performance preclude legal cognizability of the debtor's
expectations in the above example. In fact, viewed as an imple-
mentation of section 1-203, UCC section 2-208 strongly favors such
a move. The facts of the hypothetical present other factors nor-
mally favoring legal cognizability and satisfy the remaining ele-
ments of the bad faith test. Under UCC section 1-208, a finding of
bad faith will prevent the creditor from establishing default by ref-
erence to the "for any reason insecure" clause. As applied to the
creditor's attempt to enforce the "time is of the essence" clause,
the proposed test would support a finding of bad faith so as to
preclude default based upon the tardiness of the debtor's pay-
ments. The same result would follow under the traditional waiver
rules preserved under UCC section 1-103.11
Example 3: Revwal of Code Remedies When Exclusive Contract
Remedy Fails of its Essential Purpose
P.2d 589, rev'd, 92 Wash. 2d 30, 593 P.2d 167 (1978) (course of performance as waiver). On
necessity of support for a waiver, see generally 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 753 (1960); Sus-
sel Co. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 304 Minn. 433, 232 N.W.2d 88 (1975) (consideration
required for lien waiver); McLellan v. Hamernick, 264 Minn. 345, 118 N.W.2d 791 (1962)
(promissory estoppel renders lien waiver binding); U.C.C. § 1-107 (writing required).
138. For instance, as applied to personal mjuries resulting from defective goods, Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) and UCC §§ 2-314(i), 2-714(1), and 2-715(2)(b) can
result in identical liability.
139. See 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 754 (1960).
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Seller's standardized form disclaims all implied warranties, spec-
ifies a minimum technical performance level, confines the
buyer's remedy for malfunction to repair or replacement of de-
fective parts, and excludes monetary damages for both tort and
contract liability. The equipment, a word processor, covered by
the contract becomes inoperative. After dilatory and unsuccess-
ful repair efforts, seller refuses to have anything further to do
with the buyer or the machine. Buyer hires a third party who
restores the equipment to proper working order and maintains it
at the specified level of performance. Buyer sues the seller for
the cost of this service contract as well as lost profits and the
expenses incurred for additional clerical help during the down
time prior to repair by the third party.140
The result m the hypothetical dispute turns upon the interrela-
tionship between the standardized exculpatory clause and the UCC
remedial provisions, particularly sections 2-714, 2-715, and 2-719.
The contract's exclusive remedy undoubtedly failed of its essential
purpose to provide the buyer with equipment maintained in proper
working order at the seller's expense. Accordingly, the buyer may
have "remedies . as provided in this Act." Under UCC section
2-714, the buyer may recover breach of warranty damages 41 mea-
sured by the cost of the alternate service contract.1 42
140. Compare Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill.
1970) (holding that failure of exclusive remedy revives right to consequential damages), and
Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 481 P.2d 784 (1978), with S.M. Wilson &
Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978), and AES Technology Sys., Inc. v.
Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978) (failure of exclusive remedy held not to
revive automatically the right to consequential damages), and American Elec. Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), and Potomac Elec. Power Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, 527 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir.
1975), and County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323 F Supp. 1300
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
141. See S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978); Soo Line
R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977) (recovery of warranty damages per-
mitted after failure of exclusive remedy despite exculpatory clause). Not wishing to retain
the equipment, the buyer could have exercised his right to revoke acceptance and to recover
the purchase price under UCC §§ 2-608 and 2-711(1). See Polycon Indus., Inc. v. Hercules,
Inc., 471 F Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265
N.W.2d 513 (1978).
142. On the use of repair cost as a measure of value differential under UCC § 2-714(2),
see Curtis v. Murphy Elev. Co., 407 F Supp. 940 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Clark v. International
Harvester'Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978); J. WHrrE & R. SuMMEiis, supra note 9, at
377-78.
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Seller will oppose the claim for lost profits and clerical expenses
as one seeking consequential damages, the recovery of which de-
pends not only upon UCC section 2-715 but also upon section 2-
719(3), which permits contractual exclusion of such damages as
long as not unconscionible. The issue, one that has split the
courts14 3 and troubled the commentators,144 is whether a failure of
essential prupose under section 2-719(2) revives not only the basic
remedies, such as revocation of acceptance, return of the price, or
breach of warranty damages, but also the right to consequential
damages in the face of an exculpatory clause.145 Some courts con-
clude, with reasoning reminiscent of the English doctrine of
"fundamental breach, ' 146 that the seller's conduct constitutes a re-
pudiation of the contract and therewith also his rights under the
exculpatory clause. 47 Other courts hold that the exculpatory
143. See notes 140-41 supra.
144. See Eddy, supra note 92, and J. WHiTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, at 469.
145. As stated in Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978):
The UCC is ambiguous with respect to the effect that a failure of a limited
remedy under § 28-2-719(2) has on other contractual provisions. § 28-2-719(2)
provides that if a remedy fails of its essential purpose "remedy may be had as
provided in this act." The official comment states that if a remedy fails of its
purpose, "it must give way to the general remedy provisions of this article
[chapter]." I.C. § 28-2-719, Official Comment 1. The remedy provisions of that
chapter not only provide for the recovery of consequential damages, I.C. §§ 28-
2-714(3) and -715(2), but also for their exclusion where not unconscionable.
Id. at 800.
146. See G. FRiDMAN, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 286-310 (1976); Meyer, Contracts of Adhe-
SLOn and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REv. 1178 (1964); 41 MoD. L. REv.
92 (1978). Under English law, the problem is regulated largely by statute. See Unfair Con-
tract Terms Act § 9 (1977):
(I) Where for reliance upon it a contract term has to satisfy the requirement
of reasonableness, it may be found to do so and be given effect accordingly
notwithstanding that the contract has been terminated either by breach or by
a party electing to treat it as repudiated.
(2) Where on a breach the contract is nevertheless affirmed by a party enti-
tled to treat it as repudiated, this does not of itself exclude the requirement of
reasonableness in relation to any contract term.
See also 41 MOD. L. REv. 312 (1978).
147. See Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
This Court would be in an untenable position if it allowed the defendant to
shelter itself behind one segment of the warranty when it has allegedly repudi-
ated and ignored its very limited obligations under another segment of the
same warranty, which alleged repudiation has caused the very need for relief
which the defendant is attempting to avoid.
Id. at 43-44. See notes 140-41 supra.
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clause represents an intentional allocation of liability for the event
of breach and must be enforced in the absence of
unconscionability. 14 8
As applied to standardized contracts, neither approach is satis-
factory. The first requires identification of the fundamental duties
under the contract. Even in the context of negotiated contracts,
this is a question-begging process. 149 To the extent that the terms
"fundamental" and "core" are understood as synonymous with
"negotiated" or "dickered,"150 they have little or no meaning in the
context of standardized contracts. 51 The second solution purports
to give effect to the parties' own chosen liability allocation. As a
standardized term, however, an exculpatory clause represents only
a unilaterally imposed allocation of liability. Although the courts
cite the presence of negotiation as one of several factors mitigating
against revival of the right to consequential damages, 15 2 the pre-
cise role of standardized forms in the revival of remedies issue is
unresolved. The doctrine of good faith as articulated in the pro-
posed test provides the answer.
Seller's conduct easily satisfies all but the cognizability element
of the proposed test for bad faith. The buyer expected that the
equipment would be kept in working order at the expense of the
seller. Having drafted the clause that created this expectation, the
seller had knowledge thereof. The seller's refusal to effect repairs
evidences disregard of the buyer's interests. Application of the
cognizability element, however, meets with the argument that the
148. See S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978); American
Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
149. See G. FRiDMAN, supra note 146, at 287, 299.
150. See generally K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 362-71 (1960); Leff,
Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U.L. REv. 131 (1970); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv.
700 (1939). Although the UCC text does not distinguish between dickered and standardized
terms, the official comments frequently make the distinction. See U.C.C. § 2-205, Comment
4; id. § 2-207, Comment 1; id. § 2-313, Comment 1; id. § 2-316, Comment 1; id. § 2-504,
Comment 5; id. § 2-508, Comment 2; id. § 2-615, Comment 8. See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 229(d), 237(3) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
151. See Dugan, An Introduction, supra note 6, at 1320.
152. See note 148 supra. Other factors supporting nonrevival include the seller's good
faith attempt to effectuate the exclusive remedy and the complexity of the equipment. For
an attempt to reconcile the holdings by reference to these factors, see Eddy, supra note 92,
at 73-84, who considers the significance of standardized terms only in connection with his
discussion of procedural unconscionability. Id. at 42-43.
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buyer's expectation corresponds to the performance promised by
the seller in the contract. In order that good faith not supersede
more specific rules, legal cognizability should not be accorded
to interests specifically regulated either by the Code or the
contract.'53
Further analysis reveals that the good faith obligation protects
an interest entirely distinct from that regulated by the terms of the
contract. Under the agreement the seller owes the buyer a duty to
maintain operation of the equipment. This duty exists whether the
parties explicitly negotiated the relevant clauses or whether the
drafter imposed them unilaterally as standardized terms. When,
however, the relevant clauses appear as standardized terms, UCC
section 1-203, as construed in this paper, imposes upon the drafter
the additional obligation to exercise the utmost regard for the in-
terests of the nondrafter in the performance and enforcement of
those clauses. This additional duty is the price that the dominant
party pays for the privilege of unilaterally determining the content
of the legal relationship. Thus, even in the absence of bilateral m-
put into contract formation, the contract functions in the mutual
interests of the parties.
As applied in the hypothetical, the good faith obligation fills a
regulatory gap created by the use of standardized terms. A negoti-
ated exculpatory clause represents an intentional trade-off by the
buyer of his right to consequential damages in the event of seller's
breach for some other advantage under the contract. Accordingly,
under a negotiated contract the seller may choose between per-
forming the exclusive remedy or breaching it and either returning
the purchase price or paying breach of warranty damages under
UCC section 2-719(2): Having bargained for the trade-off, the
buyer cannot complain of surprise if the seller chooses the second
alternative. Conversely, the standardized contract neither mean-
ingfully apprises the buyer of the restriction upon his right to con-
sequential damages nor insures that he received a quid pro quo for
the limitation. In order to protect the buyer from surprise and to
infuse a minimum balance into the relationship, some additional
constraint must be imposed upon the seller's freedom to choose
between performance and nonperformance. The good faith obliga-
153. See notes 69, 126-28 supra & accompanying text.
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tion provides the necessary measure. If the seller's nonperformance
of the exclusive remedy constitutes bad faith, he incurs not only
the basic liability revived by section 2-719(2), but also whatever
sanctions are imposed for bad faith conduct. 154 Because this appli-
cation of the good faith duty complements the contractual regula-
tion of the seller's performance obligation, it supports granting le-
gal recognition to the buyer's expectations.
There remains only the question of proper remedy for the
seller's bad faith in the nonperformance of the exclusive remedy.
Possible sanctions include (1) conditioning enforcement upon
proof that the buyer received some qutd pro quo for relinquishing
his right to consequential damages, (2) partial nonenforcement of
the exculpatory clause by permitting recovery of out-of-pocket
losses but not lost profits, and (3) complete avoidance of the excul-
patory clause by allowing recovery of all qualifying consequential
damages. As a general rule, the sanction should be one that will
accommodate the buyer's interest with the minimum sacrifice to
the seller's position under the contract.
155
Because the imposition of the good faith obligation is premised
on a presumed absence of negotiation in a standardized contract,
the seller should be able to enforce the exculpatory clause if he can
rebut this presumption of no bargaining. For example, the seller
can rebut the presumption by showing that he offered the buyer at
a higher price an alternative standardized contract containing no
restriction upon the recovery of consequential damages.
The second proposed sanction, recovery of out-of-pocket loss,
imposes upon the seller a burden both more and less severe than
the first remedy. It is more severe than the consequences of rebut-
ting the presumption (no liability for consequential damages) but,
insofar as it limits damages to out-of-pocket loss, less severe than
the consequences of failing to rebut the presumption (liability for
154. Compare S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978) (lack
of seller's dilatoriness or willfulness as ground for nonrevival), and Jones & McKnight Corp.
v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (emphasis on seller's willful failure to
perform the exclusive remedy as ground for reviving right to consequential damages), and
Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970), with Clark v. International
Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978) (nature of seller's conduct in effectuating
exclusive remedy held immaterial for issue of revival vel non).
155. See note 99 supra & accompanying text.
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all consequential damages including lost profits).156
The second remedy also represents a rough monetary equivalent
of the good faith duty breached by the seller, at least in those cases
where seller's compliance with the good faith obligation would
have enabled the buyer to avoid the additional clerical expense.
For instance, suppose that the seller notified the buyer of his in-
tention to discontinue service, arranged for alternative service, and
performed until the alternative service contract took effect. Under
these circumstances, the seller could not be accused of bad faith
because he acted with regard to the buyer's interest; nor would the
buyer have suffered the disruption which called for additional cler-
ical help.
The third alternative sanction, complete suspension of the excul-
patory clause, is more difficult to support without permitting the
seller to rebut the presumption that the buyer received no quid
pro quo for relinquishing his right to consequential damages. Such
a result implicitly would contravene UCC section 2-719(3), which
predicates nonenforceability of exculpatory clauses solely upon a
finding of unconscionability 157 The first two sanctions, which en-
tail limitations less drastic than complete nonenforceability, do not
present the same conflict with section 2-719(3). Additionally, sus-
pension of the exculpatory clause would disregard a standardized
term, thereby violating the postulate that standardized forms pro-
vide the most appropriate starting point for resolution of dis-
putes.158 Furthermore, a seller's good faith conduct will prevent
out-of-pocket losses but it will not necessarily prevent the loss of
profits. For instance, under the circumstances described above,
seller's cooperation would have eliminated the need for clerical
help but would not have reduced the amount of down time, a de-
sign property of complicated equipment.
156. For a case which limits damage relief to recovery of out-of-pocket loss, see Polycon
Indus., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
157. Eddy, supra note 92, at 85-86, favors revival of consequential damages m the case
where seller refuses to perform the exclusive remedy. He relies, however, primarily upon
equitable principles and makes no Code-related argument. Later, he states that revival of
consequential damages should be keyed to the unconscionability element in UCC § 2-719(3).
Id. at 89-91. He suggests, without supporting analysis, that the distinction between "willful
behavior and simple inability to perform" may be relevant to the unconscionability issue.
Id. at 91.
158. See notes 21-22 supra & accompanying text.
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The proposed application of good faith to the problem of remedy
revival is limited to the situation in which the seller could have
effectuated the necessary repair but chose not to do so. Quite dif-
ferent analysis would be required when, for instance, the equip-
ment could not be placed in working order by any party This situ-
ation would affect the content of the good faith obligation, bring
into operation other legal doctrines such as those governing impos-
sibility and frustration of purpose, and require an evaluation of the
exculpatory clause in light of this additional factor."
CONCLUSION
The proposed test converts "good faith" from a largely precatory
abstract to a set of specific working rules capable of shedding light
on common legal disputes. The standard inherent in the test
requires that the user of standardized forms exercise the utmost
regard for the interests of the nondrafter. This standard follows
primarily from the UCC text and official comments which consist-
ently use good faith as a constraint upon unilateral jural
determination to protect the interests and expectations of the
subordinate party
As applied to the use of standardized terms, the proposed stan-
dard furthers the classical contract objective: the contract institu-
tion serves the interests of both parties to the transaction. Drafted
for use in an indefinite number of similar transactions, the stan-
dardized form, in the absence of such a constraint, cannot accom-
modate the special expectations of the individual nondrafter.
The proposed test duly respects the positions of the various par-
ties involved in the standardized form contracting process. The
first element of the test, existence vel non of nondrafter expecta-
tions, focuses upon the unique interests of the nondrafter, which
otherwise necessarily are ignored by the standardized form. The
legal cognizability requirement, the second element, establishes ju-
dicial control over application of the standard and invites the court
to consider the needs of commerce as well as the integrity of the
159. See Eddy, supra note 92, at 68-72, 86-88. Although the courts distinguish between
inability to perform and unwillingness to perform, see note 154 supra, they have not yet
formulated a coherent analysis to deal with the distinction in either UCC or traditional
contract terminology. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 454-69 (1932) (impossibility).
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legal system. The third element, the requirement that the drafting
party have notice of the nondrafter's expectations, keeps the draft-
ing party's burden within manageable bounds and offsets the first
element's subjective emphasis upon nondrafter expectations. The
final element tests whether the objective of the good faith man-
date, accommodation of the nondrafter's interests, has been
achieved.
The proposed good faith standard imports into contract law a
large measure of private paternalism in that it forces one party to
watch out for the interests of another. In the context of standard-
ized form contracting, it completely abrogates the traditional at-
arms-length axiom and its corollaries. This development comports
with the traditional law governing trust and agency relationships
which, as do standardized forms, entitle one party to fix the jural
position of another. As applied to standardized form contracts, be-
havior mandated by the standard represents the price that the
drafting party pays for the privilege of dictating the terms of the
transaction.
The standard embodies the conviction that, unless checked by
offsetting responsibilities, public or private concentrations of
power are incompatible with maintenance of a liberal democratic
order. Compared with the burdens imposed by recent remedial leg-
islation aimed at protecting the nondrafter class, the responsibili-
ties entailed by the proposed good faith standard lie within the
capabilities of all users of standardized forms and redound to the
benefit of all nondrafters.
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